"Trade Credit, Bank Loans, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japan" by Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer
CIRJE Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html
Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author.
CIRJE-F-381






October 2005JEL:  G21, G32 
 
University of Tokyo 
Faculty of Economics 
Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 
miwa@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp 
 
Harvard Law School 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
ramseyer@law.harvard.edu 
FAX:  617-496-6118 
 
 
Trade Credit, Bank Loans, and Monitoring: 
Evidence from Japan 
 




 Abstract:    Firms in modern developed economies can choose to borrow from 
banks or from trade partners.  Using first-difference and difference-in-differences 
regressions on Japanese manufacturing data, we explore the way they make that choice.  
Whether small or large, they do borrow from their trade partners heavily, and apparently 
at implicit rates that track the explicit rates banks would charge them.  Nonetheless, they 
do not treat bank loans and trade credit interchangeably.  Disproportionately, they borrow 
from banks when they anticipate needing money for relatively long periods, and turn to 
trade partners when they face short-term exigencies they did not expect.   
  This contrast in the term structures of bank loans and trade credit follows from 
the fundamentally different way bankers and trade partners reduce the default risks they 
face.  Because bankers seldom know their borrowers’ industries first-hand, they rely on 
guarantees and security interests.  Because trade partners know those industries well, they 
instead monitor their borrowers closely.  Because the costs to creating security interests 
are heavily front-loaded, bankers focus on long-term debt.  Because the costs of 
monitoring debtors are on-going, trade creditors do not.  Despite the enormous theoretical 
literature on bank monitoring, banks apparently monitor very little. 
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  In much of their work on trade credit, scholars focus on when and why we 
observe it:  when do firms tap trade credit and when do they borrow from banks?  Why, 
as Petersen & Rajan (1997: 661) put it, would industrial firms "extend trade credit when 
more specialized financial institutions such as banks could provide finance"?  Under what 
conditions, as Smith (1992: 674) asked in the Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance, 
would "buyers and sellers prefer trade credit relative to substitutes, such as bank 
financing, factoring, and cash"?   
  In modern advanced economies like Japan, firms raise massive amounts through 
trade credit.  Despite the contrary emphases in the literature, they borrow from trade 
partners when their partners charge less than banks.  In turn, those partners tend to charge 
less when firms need funds for unanticipated exigencies.   
  Japanese firms primarily turn to banks when they anticipate long-term needs 
against which they can offer security interests or third-party guarantees.  Banks seldom 
have a comparative advantage in monitoring.  As a result, to most borrowers they lend 
only if the borrower offers that security interest or third-party guarantee.  Because the 
costs of creating these security interests and guarantees are front-loaded, banks tend to 
lend long-term.  By contrast, trade partners do hold a comparative advantage in 
monitoring, and use it to offer cost-effective (often short-term) loans.  At root, trade 
partners tend to monitor their borrowers closely; banks actually monitor them very little. 
  With data on the financial practices of both large and small Japanese firms, we 
first examine the scope of trade credit and bank finance (Section I).  We contrast 
financing patterns over time, across industries, and by firm size.  We then estimate the 
implicit price that trade partners charge their borrowers (Section II).  Finally, we use first-
difference and difference-in-differences regressions on 1960s manufacturing data to 
explore the way firms respond to exogenous shocks (Section III). 
 
I.  The Extent of Trade Credit 
A.  Its Scope: 
  To see how extensively trade creditors fund industrial firms, consider the 
consolidated balance sheet for manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees (Table 
1).
1  For this Table 1 and much of the rest of this article, we use Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
data (described in detail below).  From 1961 to 1974, the BOJ surveyed a large number of 
manufacturing firms -- in 1965, 18,893 firms (a response rate of 74.2 percent).
2   To 
ensure that it reached enough large firms, it did not structure the surveys randomly across 
firm size.  Crucially for our regressions in Section III, however, from each firm it 
obtained both the figures for that year and the change from the preceding year.   
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  For manufacturing firms, the 1960s were years of phenomenal growth.  In the five 
years from 1963 to 1968, Japanese industry grew 90 percent.  From 1963 to 1965, 
                     
1 Of the 4,482 firms sampled, 2527 had 50-299 employees, and 1955 had 300 or more employees.   
2 The BOJ based its survey on a list of all establishments with 50 or more employees produced by the 
Ministry of International Trade & Industry for its annual census of manufacturers. Trade Credit:  Page 3 
production at the manufacturing firms grew 22 percent, and from 1965 to 68 another 58 
percent.  From 1963 to 1968, steel firms grew 117 percent, machinery firms 142 percent, 
television and radio manufacturers 207 percent, and car companies 372 percent (Tsusho 
sangyo sho, 1969: 30-11).   
  Within these boom times, 1965 was an anomaly:  a largely unanticipated and in 
some sectors deep recession.  Manufacturing profits fell over all (Table 2), and in sectors 
like textile machinery and home electrical goods, production dropped by 20 percent 
(Tsusho sangyo sho, 1969: 32).  The following year was just as anomalous, but in the 
other direction:  a largely unanticipated and sharp recovery.  Profits now climbed over 20 
percent (Table 2), and in sectors like radio & TV, battery equipment, and petrochemicals, 
production soared by 40-50 percent (Tsusho sangyo sho, 1969:  32-35). 
  [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
  During these years, Japanese manufacturing firms relied heavily on trade credit.  
Across all size categories, receivables constituted the largest category of current assets 
(Table 1; similarly, Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1995: 95).  And across all 
but the very largest firms (those with over 5000 employees), payables
3 constituted the 
largest category of current liabilities (Table 1).  At all but the biggest companies, firms 
raised more short-term funds from trade partners than from banks (similarly for U.K. 
firms, according to the Radcliffe Committee, 1959: 104-05 tab. 18; see also Bank of 
England, 2003). 
  In all size categories, firms held 20-25 percent of their assets as receivables (Table 
1).  Firms of all sizes, in other words, used nearly a quarter of their assets to supply their 
customers with credit.  Trade credit was not something large firms provided the small; it 
was something both large and small firms provided routinely.  Lending was not a 
business reserved for self-described financial intermediaries; it was an activity to which 
other firms devoted a large swath of resources. 
  Over all size categories, payables exceeded inventories.  Sometimes they even 
exceeded inventories by more than 100 percent.  Observers occasionally suggest that 
firms use trade credit to finance their inventories.  No doubt they often do.  Given how 
vastly trade credit exceeded inventory, however, they apparently use it for much more. 
  Nor is this reliance on trade credit new.  In related research, we explore the role of 
trade credit and bank loans in late 19th century Japan.  There too, we find that firms 
relied heavily on their trade partners for funds.  There too, manufacturing and trading 
firms functioned as intermediaries in the financing process (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005). 
 
B.  The Effect of Discounting: 
  Because Japanese sellers heavily discount their notes receivable with banks (or 
other financial firms), Table 1 (which excludes discounted notes) obscures their status as 
net creditors.
4  According to Table 1, all but the biggest firms hold more payables than 
receivables.  Yet the bigger manufacturing firms (those with 300 or more workers) 
discounted half their notes (by value) -- from 1961 to 1974, a figure that ranged from 
45.3 to 61.7 percent.  The smaller firms (those with 50-299 workers) discounted nearly 
                     
3 A substantial fraction of the amounts in "Current liabilities -- other" are also payables.  Unfortunately, the 
data do not specify that quantity. 
4 Japanese creditors have long maintained an elaborate system for preventing buyers from defaulting on these 
notes.  The system is described in detail in Ramseyer (1991) and Matsumura & Ryser (1995). Trade Credit:  Page 4 
three quarters -- from 1961 to 1974, 62.5 to 74.1 percent (Nihon ginko, Kibo betsu, 
various years).  Because sellers that discount their notes drop them from their balance 
sheet, the process arguably disguises the scope of the credit firms provide. 
  Potentially analogous practices exist elsewhere, of course.  In the U.S., trade 
creditors sometimes sell their receivables to a factor, and an incipient factoring market 
now operates in Japan as well.  In the U.K., firms sometimes purchase credit insurance.  
Although only the factoring takes the transaction off the balance sheet, both factoring and 
insurance shift the risk of default to a third party. 
  By contrast, discounting removes the transaction from the balance sheet but 
leaves the non-payment risk with the original lender.  Although Japanese creditors can 
use discounting to turn their receivables into cash, as endorser they remain secondarily 
liable on the notes.  In effect, by discounting the notes they post their receivables as 
collateral for a loan from a bank. 
  To capture this alternative view of Japanese trade credit, in Table 3 (and the more 
extensive Table 6, below) we add back discounted notes.  In all size categories, 
manufacturing firms now become net trade creditors.  Although receivables exceed 
payables most strikingly at the biggest firms, even the smallest firms hold substantially 
more receivables than they owe in payables.  Within the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
firms lend half again as much through trade credit as they borrow. 
  [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 
C.  Industry-Specific Variation: 
  Firms vary by industry in their lending and borrowing practices.  To illustrate the 
range within manufacturing, in Table 4 we give key values for firms in several prominent 
industries.  Although the firms in all industries were net creditors (receivables/payables > 
100), those in machinery lent especially much (receivables/payables).  Compared to the 
amount they borrow from banks, however, they borrowed less from their trade partners 
than all but the chemical and textile firms (payables/loans).   
  [Insert Table 4 about here.] 
  To explore further the inter-industry variation, for Table 5 we calculate the most 
popularly used metric:  the mean number of days that firms delay before paying their bills.  
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) approximates the time a given firm's customers delay in 
paying their bills, and Days Payables Outstanding (DPO) approximates the time the firm 
itself stalls.  Following much of the literature, we calculate DSO as 365 * 
(receivables)/(sales).  We calculate DPO as 365 * (payables)/(sales).  Although some 
writers divide payables by the cost of goods sold (COGS) rather than sales, we use sales 
because of both data accessibility and Japanese custom.  Because sales will generally 
exceed COGS (for the firms in the BOJ survey, sales were 98 percent of receipts but 
COGS was only 82 percent of expenditures; Nihon ginko, Kibo, 1965: 1), this of course 
lowers the DPO figures. 
  [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
  Here again the larger firms provide more trade credit than the small (Table 5).  
For its manufacturing-firm survey, the BOJ partitioned firms by workforce size.   
Unfortunately, for these DSO and DPO figures the Ministry of Finance partitioned firms Trade Credit:  Page 5 
by the more problematic stated-capital.
5  Nonetheless, by this measure as well, the bigger 
firms extend more credit:  they let their customers pay more slowly (DSO rises from 
small firms to large), and pay their own bills more quickly (DPO falls). 
  Observers sometimes claim that the large trading companies (e.g., C. Itoh & Co., 
Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui Trading) finance Japanese manufacturing.  Given their large 
sales base, they do indeed lend massive amounts.  Yet wholesaling firms generally 
offered their customers 60-65 days of credit, while manufacturing firms offered 65-75.  
The biggest wholesaling firms (the group with C. Itoh, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui Trading) 
offered 60-75 days, while the largest manufacturers offered 75-85.  The wholesaling 
firms even paid their own bills more slowly:  60-75 days, while manufacturing firms paid 
in 55-70 (Table 5).  
  Table 6 confirms several of these generalizations.  In virtually every sector except 
retail sales, firms are net providers of trade credit.  Whether in the 1960s or more recently, 
whether in manufacturing or in the service sector, they lent their trade partners extensive 
funds.   
  [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
 
II.  The Price of Trade Credit 
A.  Introduction: 
  In asking why firms borrow from their trade partners, scholars typically assume 
that those partners charge far more than banks.  If they charged less, we doubt the 
Palgrave would ask why buyers preferred their credit.  In this, the Palgrave is hardly an 
outlier.  Wilson, Summers & Singleton (1997: 2) describe trade credit as "a premium-
priced source of short-term finance."  Smith (1992: 674) suggests its rates are "frequently 
much higher than funds obtained from financial institutions."   
  Pricing trade credit is hard, of course.  Trade partners seldom levy an explicit 
interest rate, and apparently no central depository collects information on the terms they 
do impose.  As a result, scholars typically obtain a price only by using hypothesized cash-
discount terms to "back out" an interest rate.   
  Petersen-Rajan (1994, 1997) illustrate the practice.  At the outset, they assume 
sellers offer the "2/10 Net 30" terms routinely described in academic accounts.  If a buyer 
pays within 10 days, it can take a 2 percent discount; otherwise, it must pay in full within 
30 days.  Effectively, a buyer who waits 30 days pays a 2 percent premium for a 20-day 
loan.  Effectively, reason Petersen-Rajan, it borrows at an annual interest rate of over 40 
percent.   
  Like most other writers in the field, Petersen-Rajan (1997: 668; see 1994: 21) take 
the ubiquity of 2/10 Net 30 on faith.  They acknowledge that they "do not know the 
actual discount offered."  They then cite Smith (1987) for the 2/10 Net 30 terms, and use 
them to calculate the analytically crucial 40+ percent.  Smith (1987) herself, though, 
offers no evidence on the use of 2/10 Net 30.  She simply describes the 2 percent discount 
                     
5 The Ministry of Finance also publishes these data in quarterly form, but we here rely on the annual volume 
(Okura sho, various years).  Note that the figures are the arithmetic mean of the values for the beginning and end of 
each period.  The figures exclude discounted notes.  Note that the figures are not noticeably different for the 1960s and 
1970s before the purported deregulation of the 1980s.  On the insignificance of the earlier regulatory regime, see Miwa 
& Ramseyer (2004). Trade Credit:  Page 6 
as one of "two most common forms of trade credit" (Smith, 1992: 674).  As the other 
"most common" form, she lists a 30-day loan with no discount at all.  
 
B.  Why Take It? 
  Having concluded that trade credit comes only at an exorbitant price, scholars 
turn to the obvious conundrum:  why take it?  Why borrow from a trade partner at 40+ 
percent when banks lend at less than half the price?  To date, the answers come in two 
variants. 
  First, scholars suggest that firms take the trade credit when banks will not lend.  
Because banks ration credit, they write, some firms will have nowhere else to go, and to 
explain why banks might ration they turn to Stiglitz & Weiss (1981).  Given moral hazard 
and adverse selection, reason Stiglitz-Weiss, in environments with asymmetric 
information banks may refuse some firms loans at any rate at all.   
  Within the world at large, continue most scholars, this Stiglitz-Weiss dynamic 
pushes firms toward trade credit (i) "in countries with less developed financial 
intermediaries" (Fisman & Love, 2003: 373), and (ii) (an overlapping category) in 
economies "with undeveloped legal systems that do not effectively support financial 
development" (Levine, 2004: 38-39).  Within the developed economies, it pushes toward 
trade credit (y) the smaller and newer firms -- "small growing firms" (Wilson, Summers 
& Singleton, 1997: 2), or (z) firms "that are restricted in their ability to obtain funds" 
more generally (Schwartz, 1974: 655).   
  Second, scholars argue that trading partners use the credit (despite its high price) 
to further "non-financial" goals.  Where trade involves substantial relationship-specific 
investment, for example, perhaps sellers offer credit on terms that let them sort potential 
buyers by default risk (Smith, 1987).  Where buyers can verify product quality only ex 
post, perhaps they use it to let them verify before paying (Long, Malitz & Ravid, 1993; 
Lee & Stowe, 1993).  Where product demand varies, perhaps buyers and sellers use 
credit to allocate inventory (Emery, 1987) or precautionary money holdings (Ferris, 
1981).  And where sellers enjoy market power, perhaps they use credit to enforce price 
discrimination (Brennan, Miksimovic & Zechner, 1988; Mian & Smith, 1992).  
 
C.  Doubts: 
  1.  Cash discounts. -- Despite this literature, scholars offer little actual evidence of 
usurious credit terms.  Although they routinely invoke the canonical 2/10 Net 30, none 
has measured its prevalence.  Certainly, writers in the practitioner press do not focus on 
2/10 Net 30.  Instead, they typically give a wide range of discount terms.   
  For example, both the National Association of Credit Management's (2003: 135) 
Principles of Business Credit and the Credit Research Foundation's (1999: 7) handbook 
on contractual terms do calculate the implicit interest rates behind cash discounts.  Yet 
rather than focus on any one term, they calculate the effective rates on terms ranging 
from 0.5/30 Net 90 (3 percent) to 5/15 Net 30 (120 percent).  Neither source suggests that 
2/10 Net 30 (much less any higher rate) dominates the market.   
  Within Japan, we know of no evidence that sellers use these extravagant "cash 
discounts."  When we raised the issue with business executives, most refused to believe 
financially healthy sellers would offer them.  If sellers did, they refused to believe Trade Credit:  Page 7 
financially healthy buyers would reject them.  Even to offer such a discount, they assured 
us, would be publicly to admit financial distress. 
  Indeed, Petersen-Rajan (1994: 24 tab. VII; 1995: 426) themselves find that sellers 
offer cash discounts -- any cash discounts -- only 30-35 percent of the time.  That the 
sellers offer no discount on 2/3 of their sales does not mean they extend their credit 
interest-free, of course.  It simply means they incorporate the cost of the funds into the 
price of the goods they sell (or its other attributes).  They bundle credit with the goods, in 
short, and price the resulting package at a rate that maximizes the joint buyer-seller 
surplus.   
 
  2.  Stated and effective terms. -- In truth, the true price of credit need not depend 
on its express terms anyway.  As the Arkansas Small Business Development Center 
(2005) advises its member firms:   
Stated terms are irrelevant. ...  What the vendor states as terms for payment on the 
invoice doesn't count.  Even finance charges assessed don't count if you never 
actually have to pay them. 
Instead, writes the Center, a firm should pay an invoice five days late to "[s]ee what 
happens."  If nothing does, it should pay the next invoice ten days late.  It should 
continue until the vendor complains, and then "[b]ack off from that point by a few days."  
Then but only then will it know the seller's "real terms."   
  In deciding whether to take a cash discount, a rational firm will not calculate the 
effective interest rate it would bear if it paid the bills by the stated due date.  Rather, it 
will calculate the rate it would bear if it paid by the date it expects the seller actually to 
enforce.  If a supplier states 2/10 net 30 but lets a buyer pay 20 days late, the relevant 
interest rate is not 40 percent.  It is 20. 
  The terms suppliers actually enforce seem to vary widely by industry, within an 
industry, and over time.  In 2002, for instance, CFO magazine surveyed 967 U.S. 
companies about (i) how late their buyers paid them (their DSO), and (ii) and how late 
they paid their own suppliers (their DPO; Reason, 2002).  According to its report, the 22 
firms in communications technology (with mean sales of $5.4 billion) had a mean DPO 
of 40 days and a mean DSO of 63.  The DPO ranged from 14 to 170, with the group 
mean down 20 days from the year before; the DSO ranged from 13 to 107, with the group 
mean down 23 days.  The 102 utilities firms ($7.0 billion mean sales) had a mean DPO of 
31 days within an 8-148 range, down 14 days from the year before, and a mean DSO of 
45 within a 9-639 range, down 14 days.
6  And the 62 firms in technology ($7.1 billion 
mean sales) had a mean DPO of 31 days within a 5-126 range, down 4 days, and a mean 
DSO of 61 within a 8-178 range, down 10 days. 
  Although Petersen-Rajan recognize this problem (1994: 21; 1995: 426 n.17), they 
suggest that firms incur "reputational and pecuniary costs" if they delay.  Potentially, of 
course, dilatory firms do suffer a reputational loss.  Sellers may demand trade references 
from prospective borrowers.  They may swap credit information with other sellers.  They 
may buy credit reports from credit-rating firms like D&B and Experian.   
  Yet precisely because of these potential costs, buyers delay strategically.  The 
Arkansas (2005) small business center, again, advises firms to classify their suppliers by 
                     
6 Dropping Hawaiian Electric with its DSO of 639 brings the mean DSO to 39 with a 9-196 range.  Trade Credit:  Page 8 
precisely these potential costs.  If a seller "[s]upplies critical components or materials," it 
urges them to pay the firm on time.  If a seller never charges penalties or notices late 
payments and sells mass-market goods they could find elsewhere, it tells them to pay the 
firm late.  And -- crucial to the inquiry here -- if a seller "is a member of a professional 
association or a major supplier in an industry and provides credit information to others," 
it again advises them to consider any delays costly. 
  Even the strictest firms sometimes pay late anyway.  D&B calls a payment 
delinquent only if 90 days past due.  On a 2/10 Net 30 loan, it thus would mark an 
account delinquent only after 120 days.  It gives a firm a median commercial credit score 
even if it has "at least 25% of its payments slow and at least 10% of its payments 90 days 
or more past due."  In the U.K., Wilson & Summers (2002) find that firms pay only 60 
percent of their bills on time, and typically pay no interest on their delays.  According to 
Table 5, in only rare sectors do Japanese firms pay their bills within 30 days. 
  
  3.  Comparative monitoring costs.-- For several reasons, many trade creditors 
should be able to monitor their debtors more cost-effectively than banks, and if they 
monitor cheaply should be able to lend cheaply as well.
7  First, they work either in the 
same industry as the borrower or in a neighboring one.  As a result, they will often hold 
better information about a borrower’s competitiveness than a bank would ever have.   
They will know the product it offers, the product its competitors offer, and the level of 
demand for all those products. 
  Second, most trade creditors visit a borrower’s facilities regularly to trade.   
Manufacturers will visit retail outlets that specialize in their goods.  They will visit 
suppliers who offer idiosyncratic products and services.  Franchisors will visit their 
franchisees.  Wholesalers may visit retailers that specialize in their goods.  If for any of 
these reasons a creditor already visits a borrower’s facilities, the marginal costs to lending 
are that much lower.  
  Third, because a trade creditor maintains regular contact with a borrower’s 
industry, it can often efficiently collect on any collateral.  Should a borrower default, a 
trade creditor will know where and how to liquidate the assets it obtains.  A bank, by 
contrast, often will not. 
  If trade creditors can indeed monitor cost-effectively, they should also be able to 
lend cost-effectively.  And if so, then the empirical claim that they lend only at double the 
interest rate banks charge looks more dubious still.  Petersen-Rajan (1995: 426 n.18) 
suggest that "[t]rade credit is presumably very expensive because firms are not in the 
business of lending."  Yet in bundling loans with the goods they sell, these firms are 
indeed in the lending business.  In competitive credit markets,
8 firms that lend only at 
                     
7 One can also contrast the monitoring capabilities of trade partners and banks in terms of economies of scope 
that run in differing directions.  When trade creditors lend, they use the information they acquire in buying and selling 
goods and services.  When banks lend, they potentially use the information they acquire in taking deposits.   
Unfortunately for the bank, a firm need not route its transactions through bank accounts.  As a result, a bank that 
handles its accounts necessarily learns only about a potentially incomplete subset of transactions.  What is more, the 
firm can (and most firms do) maintain accounts with multiple banks.  Again, its banks will learn about only a subset of 
its transactions.  For both of these reasons, a firm can easily game the system.   
8 Despite the putative regulatory framework, Japanese financial markets have long been competitive.  See 
generally Miwa & Ramseyer (2004). Trade Credit:  Page 9 
40+ percent will not long stay in business.  If firms routinely do offer extensive trade 
credit, perhaps they do not really lend at 40+ percent. 
 
D.  Reexamining Trade Credit: 
  1.  The price on discounted notes. -- To reexamine the price trade creditors charge, 
we turn to a source other than cash discounts.  Rather than rely on terms sellers seldom 
offer and buyers rarely refuse, we "back out" an implicit interest rate from the note 
discounting process.  Earlier (Section I.B.), we suggested that sellers who discount their 
notes receivable effectively post them as security for a bank loan.  Functionally, however, 
the process is also equivalent to a loan from a bank to the purchaser with a guarantee 
from the seller. 
  Posit three parties:  a seller (S), a purchaser (P), and a bank (B).  In the 
quintessential credit sale followed by discounting, (i) S conveys a product to P, (ii) P 
gives a note promising future payment to S, (iii) S endorses the note and submits it to B, 
(iv) B pays S a sum of money less than the face amount of the note, and (v) some time 
later, P pays the face amount of the note to B. 
  Effectively, this transaction constitutes a loan from B to P, guaranteed by S, under 
an agreement by P to pay the cash immediately to S.  If so, then (a) the difference 
between the face amount of the note and the cash B pays P (immediately forwarded to S) 
is the interest on B's loan to P; (b) that interest reflects the risk of a double default by P 
and S; and (c) the cash paid by P to S represents the sum of (1) the price of the product 
and (2) the price of S's guarantee.   
  For those receivables that a seller discounts with a bank, then, the discount 
represents the price of the trade credit to the buyer.  As noted earlier, Japanese sellers 
discount half to three-quarters of their notes.  When they do, they obtain rates 
commensurate with those banks charge on their own loans.  Table 7 compares the 
average annual interest rate firms paid on bank loans from 1956 to 1970, with the 
effective interest rate they paid on discounted notes.  Although they paid less on their 
loans than on discounted notes in some years, the difference was modest.  It never 
exceeded 3/10ths of a percent, and for nine of the fifteen years they actually paid less on 
discounts than for loans.  
  [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
 
  2.  The logic to discounted notes. -- In effect, a bank that discounts a note piggy-
backs on the trade partner’s (generally) superior monitoring capability.  When a seller 
chooses to offer a buyer credit, it does so because it finds the buyer a cost-effective risk.  
When that seller endorses the note to a bank, it then credibly vouches for the buyer’s 
reliability.  After all, by endorsing the note it agrees to make good any loss if the buyer 
defaults.  Reasonably enough, banks thereupon willingly discount most notes at low 
interest rates.   
  If any selection bias is at work here, it is modest.  Sellers do not necessarily 
discount only their lowest-risk notes.  Although they sometimes choose to hold a note 
rather than discount it, sometimes they choose to do so simply because they do not need 
more money.  If they do not need funds to exploit their competitive projects, they will 
keep their receivables and collect the funds when they come due. Trade Credit:  Page 10 
  Other BOJ data detail the distribution of interest rates on discounted notes and 
bank loans.  Of the 5.9 trillion yen in notes discounted in 1965, banks discounted only 1.3 
billion (0.02 percent of the total) at annual interest rates of 10.59 percent or higher.   
Among the BOJ’s 0.36-percentage-point partitions, the modal rate on discounted notes 
was 7.69-8.03 percent (900 billion yen, or 15.4 percent of the notes).  By contrast, the 
modal rate on bank loans was 8.40-8.76 percent.  In 1970, banks discounted 3.8 billion 
yen in notes (.03 percent of the total) at 10 percent or higher, and set the modal discount 
at 8.25-8.50 percent; they made their modal loan at 7.67-8.03 percent.  In 1960, they 
discounted 7.7 billion yen in notes (.29 percent) at 10.59 percent or higher, and set the 
modal discount at 6.94-7.30 percent; they made their modal loan at exactly the same 
range (Nihon ginko, Honpo, various years). 
 
  3.  Trade credit and delegated monitoring. -- Return then to the Palgrave question:  
why or when would "buyers and sellers prefer trade credit relative to substitutes, such as 
bank financing"?  The evidence on price suggests that for most firms the probable answer 
is simple:  they prefer trade credit when the money they want comes cheaper that way.  In 
corporate finance as in everything else, they equalize on the margin.  If extra funds come 
cheapest from a bank, they take out a loan.  If they come cheaper from a trade partner 
(who may or may not discount its note with a bank), they borrow from that partner 
instead. 
  When trade partners do offer a competitive price, they probably do so by 
exploiting their comparative advantage (discussed above) in screening and monitoring 
potential borrowers.  The logic involved merely extends Diamond's (1984) well-known 
discussion of delegated monitoring to trade credit.  Individuals invest in financial 
intermediaries, Diamond reasoned, to capture the economies of scale that accrue to 
screening and monitoring end-users.  Rather than screen and monitor directly, they 
delegate the job to intermediaries.  Rather than invest in end-users, they invest in 
intermediaries who screen and monitor the end-using firms on their behalf. 
  Although readers sometimes describe Diamond’s model as a theory of banking, 
by his own terms Diamond offers a theory of financial intermediation more generally.  
Within that world of intermediaries, banks compete with self-described financial 
intermediaries like mutual funds and insurance companies.  Crucial to the discussion here, 
they also compete with commercial and industrial firms that offer trade credit.  
  In effect, Diamond models the intermediary industry as a whole.  Sometimes a 
given financial institution (like a bank) may perform all the functions he describes (raise 
funds, lend to end-users).  Yet often it will not.  Instead, a variety of firms may specialize 
in a variety of the tasks involved in that intermediation.  One firm will raise funds from 
investors.  Another will route the funds to the end-users.  Rather than invest its funds in 
end-users itself, a bank may route its funds to a firm better able to screen and monitor 
them.  Rather than perform all the functions Diamond raised, it will split the tasks with an 
end-user’s trade partners (or the end-user's trade partner's trade partners) instead.  
 
III.  The Choice Between Trade Credit and Bank Loans 
A.  Term Structure: 
  1.  Alternative risk-reduction technologies. -- For all the reasons raised earlier, 
banks will seldom show a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring a borrower.  Trade Credit:  Page 11 
That advantage will instead lie with a borrower’s trade partners.  Yet that banks cannot 
monitor as effectively as trade partners does not mean they will not lend.  Instead, they 
will cut their default risk through other strategies.  In Japan, they cut it by lending to 
firms that can offer either security interests or third-party guarantees.   
  In the fiscal year ending 1960, for instance, banks took security interests on 44.1 
percent of their loans (by value), and third-party guarantees on 21.7.  In 1965, they took 
security interests on 45.3 percent and guarantees on 21.6 percent of their loans.  And in 
1970, they took security interests on 45.7 percent and guarantees on 23.0 (Nihon ginko, 
Honpo, various years).  Although that leaves about a 1/3 of the loans unsecured and 
without a guarantor, according to the Mitsubishi Bank banks made almost all those loans 
to a few very large TSE-listed firms.  To most borrowers, they lent only if the firm could 
offer a security interest or guarantee (Mitsubishi, 1983: 76). 
  The financial services industry is not an industry that harbors many corner 
solutions.  To be sure, firms seldom borrow all their funds from banks.  Yet neither do 
they borrow only from their trade partners.  Most firms borrow some funds from their 
partners and some from banks.  Many even borrow from self-described non-bank 
financial intermediaries.  With no legal obligation to do so, they choose to borrow from 
trade partners, banks, and other intermediaries.
9   
  
  2.  Implications for loan terms. -- These contrasting risk-reduction strategies for 
banks and trade partners will profoundly affect the term-structure of the loans in place.  
For expositional simplicity, consider two polar (albeit overlapping) strategies:  (A) those 
designed to prevent a creditor from lending to firms that default, and (B) those designed 
to protect it if a firm does default.  Quintessentially, creditors avoid lending to defaulting 
firms (Strategy (A)) by monitoring them throughout the course of the loan.  If and when a 
debtor starts to fall into distress, they pull their loans and lend no more.   
  By contrast, creditors protect themselves in the event of default (Strategy (B)) by 
demanding security interests.  They protect their investment by obtaining the right to take 
possession and sell specified assets should a debtor not pay.  Ideally, they take property 
worth more than the face amount of the loan.  If they do, then whether a debtor defaults 
or no, they still recover their loan. 
  These different risk-reduction strategies carry implications for the term structure 
of the loans involved.  To monitor a debtor, creditors must expend resources on an on-
going basis.  Because even a healthy firm can fall into distress, they will need regularly to 
devote time and resources to obtaining reliable information about it. 
  Security interests are different.  To obtain a security interest, creditors must invest 
heavily at the outset, but will incur fewer costs to protect it during the course of the loan.  
Before they lend, they will require a debtor to post real estate, marketable securities, or 
other tangible properties.  To transform those assets into a legally enforceable security 
interest, they will draft contracts more complex than a simple loan.  They will file those 
documents with the appropriate government offices.  But once they do all this, they have 
less need (not no need, to be sure) to monitor the debtor on a continuing basis.   
                     
9 As Table 1 shows, firms do not raise all their funds through trade credit and bank loans.  Although the two 
constitute the largest categories of borrowed money, firms do have a wide variety of ways to adjust to financial shocks:  
e.g., raise equity, reduce cash and deposits, cut receivables.  One cannot simply consider payables and loans as each a 
"remainder" of the other. Trade Credit:  Page 12 
  From their front-end loaded investment, banks and firms will earn quasi-rents so 
long as the loan remains outstanding.  Necessarily, they will have an interest in keeping 
the arrangement in effect.  Conversely, they will find the creation of security interests 
most cost-effective for those loans which they both expect will stay in place for relatively 
long periods.  When firms have security interests or guarantors that they can cost-
effectively offer their creditors, disproportionately they will turn to banks; 
disproportionately, from them they will borrow long-term. 
  Because monitoring costs are not front-loaded, creditors earn few quasi-rents 
from loans that rely on monitoring-based risk-reduction strategies.  Rather than invest in 
legal protections at the outset, the creditors will need regularly to monitor their debtors 
while the loans remain outstanding.  Earning few quasi-rents, they will earn few benefits 
from keeping the arrangement in place; expecting few quasi-rents, they will have little 
reason to focus on loans that they expect to stay in place long-term.  When firms need 
loans short-term (or when the costs to a debtor of providing a security interest or 
guarantor exceed the costs to a creditor of monitoring the debtor), disproportionately the 
firms will turn to their trade partners. 
 
  3.  Preliminary observations. -- Figures 1 and 2 reflect this intuition.  Here, we 
chart the year-to-year rate of change in the amount of trade credit and short-term (under 1 
year) bank loans over 1961-1974.  For informational purposes, we partition the firms by 
the number of employees.   
  [Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.] 
  The point is simple:  the growth rate of bank loans is far steadier than that of trade 
credit.  Although the composition of trade credit and bank loans appears stable over the 
long-term, it varies considerably over the short-.  Firms turn to banks for funds they 
expect to need for relatively long periods -- unexpected fluctuations in financial need 
largely do not matter.  To cover those fluctuations, they instead turn to their trade 
partners.  Table 8 confirms what the two figures show graphically:  the coefficient of 
variation in the growth rate of trade credit dramatically exceeds the figure for the growth 
rate of loans.  Parenthetically, note that none of this reflects regulatory intervention:  the 
amounts of trade credit and bank loans instead reflect the choices of the lenders and 
borrowers involved. 
  [Insert Table 8 about here.] 
 
B.  Empirical Explorations: 
  1.  Potential misspecification. -- To explore the Palgrave puzzle (when do firms 
choose trade credit over bank loans), scholars typically regress a firm’s trade credit on its 
financial and industrial characteristics.  Entrepreneurs, however, choose both the 
boundaries of their firm and its financing decisions partly on the basis of the (unobserved 
to the scholar) monitoring technology available.
10    For the scholar, this joint 
determination potentially renders the typical regression misspecified. 
  In part, the issue raises the make-or-buy (or make-or-sell) question so central to 
much of industrial organization.  Suppose entrepreneur E plans to make gadget G.  G 
includes component C, and in turn becomes part of end-product P.  E could buy C on the 
                     
10 Of course, monitoring costs are one type of transactions costs, and monitoring technology is one type of 
transaction-cost-saving technology. Trade Credit:  Page 13 
market, assemble G, and then sell it to a P maker on the market.  Or he could make C 
himself.  He could incorporate it into G.  He could incorporate G into P.  He could do all 
these steps -- integrating vertically from start to finish.  And he could even integrate into 
distribution. 
  In deciding how far vertically to integrate, E will weigh many issues, but one will 
involve how cost-effectively he can monitor the production of C and P.  In the process, he 
will also affect the amount of trade credit in circulation.  After all, any funds he lends a 
buyer will constitute trade credit.  Any funds he lends an internal division will not.  In 
deciding whether to lend a trade partner funds, E will similarly need to weigh the 
monitoring technology available.  In deciding how much to lend and on what terms, he 
will again need to consider how cost-effectively he can monitor that partner’s activities.   
  Necessarily, then, entrepreneur E will choose both (a) the boundaries of his firm 
and (b) the trade partners to whom he lends on the basis of (c) the monitoring technology 
available to him.  Yet the boundaries of the firm will indirectly affect the amount of trade 
credit observed.  Necessarily, both the usual dependent variable (the financing decision) 
and independent variables (the firm’s financial and industrial structure) will be jointly 
determined by an unobserved third measure.  Necessarily, any regression of financing 
measures on firm structure may be misspecified.   
 
  2.  Differences. -- To address this potential misspecification, we use difference 
regressions.  Consider first the data involved, and then the regression specifications 
themselves.   
 
 (a)    Data.  Introduction.  We base our regressions on the BOJ manufacturing-firm 
data described earlier.  Note that the BOJ did not report firm-level results.  Instead, it 
partitioned the data by industry (14 categories) and firm size (7 ranks, by number of 
employees) and published the information on the resulting cells.  Because several 
industries lacked firms in the larger ranks, this process yielded slightly fewer than 98 
cells. 
  We do not pool this data across years.  After all, by increasing or decreasing its 
work force, a firm could migrate across cells from year to year.  Instead, we rely on the 
fact that the BOJ asked firms for information both on that year and on the change from 
the preceding year.  By exploiting that change, we calculate differences without pooling 
the data. 
  We focus on the three years from 1964 to 1966.  As Table 2 shows, the 1960s 
were generally boom years for Japanese manufacturing firms, and most firms would have 
anticipated the good performance of 1964.  The next year saw a deep recession, however, 
and 1966 brought a similarly sharp recovery.  Many firms would have anticipated neither 
the 1965 drop nor the 1966 climb. 
 
 Variables.  We construct the following variables: 
Payables:  Accounts payable -- kaikake kin plus shiharai tegata. 
Short-term Loans:  bank loans of under one year. 
Loans:  Total short- and long-term loans. 
Inventory:  Tanaoroshi shisan. 
Assets:  Total assets, or so shisan. Trade Credit:  Page 14 
Sales:  Net sales, or jun uriage daka. 
Income:  Operating profits, or eigyo rieki. 
 
 Differences.  From these variables, we calculate two measures of year-to-year 
change: 
 
Growth: the percentage growth in a variable.  Let Payables be P and Assets be A.  
Payables (Growth) would equal 100 * (Pt - Pt-1)/Pt-1. 
Normalized Change:  the change in a variable, normalized by total assets at t-1 
and expressed as a percentage.  Payables (Normalized Change) would 
equal 100 * (Pt - Pt-1)/At-1. 
 
 (b)  First-differences.  We assume that the unobserved determinants of a firm’s 
basic industrial structure and financing decisions are long-term.  Invariant from year to 
year, they disappear in first-differences.  Accordingly, to eliminate the misspecification 
inherent in the typical regression of financial structure on firm characteristics, we take 
first-differences. 
  We first model the composition of firm j’s financial reliance Y (e.g., the amount it 
raises from trade credit or bank loans) in time t as the product 
 (1)  Yt 膁 莿 菆j St SRVt
 
where 莿 represents the economy-wide determinants of Y (based on the medium- and 
long-term expectations of firms in the industry); where 菆j gives the unobserved firm- 
(or cell-) specific determinants of firm j’s (or cell j’s) reliance on trade credit and bank 
loans; where St provides a size index; and where SRVt represents the short-run variation 
in Y at time t.   
  In turn, we model St as Soe
gt, where So represents the value of S at t = 0, and g 








The term represents the product of a set of n possible determinants (e.g., inventory, sales, 
operating profits) of the firm’s reliance on trade credit and bank loans.  For each 




the firm’s expected level at time t as a product of its initial level at t = 0 and e
g
i
t (where gi 
represents the expected medium- and long-term growth rate of Xi).  Equation (1) is thus 
equal to:  









 Note  that  菀i gives the pace at which the firm’s trade credit or bank loans respond 
to short-term variations in firm performance.  For all the reasons given earlier, we 
hypothesize that the 菀i's for bank loans will be close to 0, while that for trade credit will 
be positive. 
  If we take the logs of Equation (2), differentiate with respect to t, and rearrange 




















  This now yields the regression model for our Growth variables.  The left term 
gives the growth rate in the amount of trade credit or bank loans; the first two terms on 
the right become a constant; and 菀i gives the coefficient on the growth rate of variable 
Xi.  Note that each 菀 will equal the elasticity of the firm’s trade credit or bank loans 
with respect to that variable.
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  Given the possibility that our specific functional form might be too restrictive, as 
our second model we use a straightforward first-differences model in which the amount 
of trade credit or bank loans at each firm (or cell) is a linear combination of several 
factors.  We take first differences, and to avoid heteroskedasticity in the error terms 
normalize the variables by Assets at time t-1.  Because this introduces the effect of 
Assets in the intercept, we add 1/Assetst-1. as an independent variable in our regressions.  
We then use our Normalized Change variables. 
  We use a variety of proxies for economic activity in our regressions.  We posit 
that firms primarily determine the short-term funds they need by monitoring inventories 
and sales, and that creditors gauge borrower risk through income levels.  We thus use 
Inventory, Sales, and Income, and hypothesize that the coefficient on all three will be 
(for Payables) positive.  
 
 (c)  Difference-in-differences.  To test whether firms respond differently to 
anticipated and largely unanticipated shocks,
12  we employ a difference-in-differences 
approach.  As noted earlier, we posit that the unobserved determinants of the level of 
bank loans and trade credit at a firm come in two types:  determinants that are constant, 
and those that vary from year to year.  We eliminate the former by differencing the 
equations -- through first-differences, in other words, all structural and firm-specific 
factors that are invariant over time disappear.   
  To test whether firms respond differently to more and less unanticipated 
exigencies, we add several dummy variables and use a difference-in-differences approach.  
More specifically, we posit that firms adjust the level of trade credit -- but not of bank 
loans -- in response to short-term or unanticipated shocks.  To test this proposition, we 
identify several groups of firms that experienced such shocks over 1964-66:  the most 
poorly performing firms during the 1965 recession, and the best performing firms during 
the 1966 recovery: 
Very Low Inventory Growth:  all cells that in 1965 had sales growth rates of 5.0 
percent or lower (18 percent of the cells). 
Low Inventory Growth:  all cells that in 1965 had sales growth rates of 6.9 
percent or lower (32 percent of the cells). 
                     
11 The functional form implies that a regression on the bank loans, with 菀=0, will generate a constant term 
larger than that on payables.  Tables 9-12 give exactly that result.  
12 Although our regressions take the form of classic difference-in-differences regressions, we do not suggest 
that the shocks were entirely unanticipated.  Instead, for our purposes, we simply posit that firms are better able to 
predict some financial needs than others -- and use this format to explore whether they adopt different approaches to 
funding more and less predictable needs.  The point of the Table 10 regressions, of course, is that they do indeed adopt 
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High Inventory Growth:  all cells that in 1966 had sales growth rates of 20 
percent or higher (29 percent of the cells). 
Very High Inventory Growth:  all cells that in 1966 had sales growth rates of 25 
percent or higher (20 percent of the cells). 
Very Low Sales Growth:  all cells that in 1965 had sales growth rates of 7.9 
percent or lower (19 percent of the cells). 
Low Sales Growth:  all cells that in 1965 had sales growth rates of 10 percent or 
lower (30 percent of the cells). 
High Sales Growth:  all cells that in 1966 had sales growth rates of 20 percent or 
higher (33 percent of the cells). 
Very High Sales Growth:  all cells that in 1966 had sales growth rates of 24 
percent or lower (21 percent of the cells). 
 
  3.  Results. -- (a) First differences.  In Panel A of Table 9, we use first differences 
and our Growth variables to explore the determinants of changes in accounts Payable.  
The results largely confirm our hypothesis:  firms respond to short-term and 
unanticipated changes by adjusting the amount of money they borrow from their trade 
partners.  Thus, changes in Inventory have a positive, strongly significant, and stable 
effect on changes in Payables.  Changes in Sales have a similarly positive and significant 
effect.  Probably because of collinearity, changes in Income have a weaker effect -- but 
still significant and positive for 1966.  Over the three years, these combinations of 
Inventory,  Sales, and Income together explain 29 to 75 percent of the variation in 
accounts Payable.
13 
  [Insert Table 9 about here.] 
  By contrast, firms are far less likely to adjust the amount of their bank Loans 
(Panel B).  Changes in Inventory, Sales, and Income have only a haphazard effect on 
changes in Loans.  Most coefficients are insignificant, and when significant the sign of 
Income is negative:  firms respond to increased Income by cutting the amounts they 
borrow from banks.  Even when significant, the coefficient on Inventory growth (and 
hence, the elasticity) is far lower than it is for accounts Payable.  All told, the variables 
together explain only 0 to 32 percent of the variation in Loans.   
  In Panels C and D we run similar regressions with our Normalized Change 
variables.  The results largely track those of our Growth model.  Changes in Inventory, 
Sales and Income have a strong and significant effect on changes in Payables, and 
together explain 45 to 81 percent of the variation.  They have an only haphazard effect on 
changes in Loans, and together explain 0 to 24 percent of the variation. 
  The much smaller effect of changes in firm finances on changes in bank Loans is 
not an artifact of pooling short- and long-term loans.  In other (unreported) regressions, 
we run regressions separately on the Growth  variables for short-term loans.  The 
coefficients are significant only for Sales and Income in 1965 and for Income in 1966.   
  
                     
13 Some of the calculated coefficients are unstable in part because the proxies for economic activity are 
occasionally closely correlated.  The correlation coefficients between changes in Inventory and in Operating Profits 
(Normalized Change), for example, were 0.40 in 1966.  Between changes in Inventory and in Sales, they were 0.49 
(1966), and between changes in Sales and in Income they were 0.55 (1966).   Trade Credit:  Page 17 
 (b)  Difference-in-differences.  To explore the way firms respond to unanticipated 
economic shocks in financing their activities, we use a standard difference-in-differences 
approach.  As noted earlier, we identify the firms that experience the shocks with several 
dichotomous variables based on Sales and Inventory, and use the  coefficient on these 
variables to capture the effect of the economic shocks.  Because changes in Income 
explain less of the change in borrowed funds than Sales and Inventory (see Table 9), we 
drop the Income variable.  Note that we do not demand that the shocks be entirely 
unanticipated.  Instead, we simply use the regressions to ask whether firms respond 
differently to more and less unanticipated events.   
  The resulting Table 10 regressions illustrate several points.  First, they confirm 
the central message of the first-differences regressions in Table 9:  firms respond to 
relatively unanticipated exigencies through trade credit rather than bank loans.  Consider 
the Growth regressions in Panel A.  As in first-differences, increases in Inventory and 
Sales  cause firms to borrow significantly more from their trade partners.  Panel C 
illustrates the same point with the Normalized Change variables.  Moreover, changes in 
Inventory have no effect on bank Loans, and increased Sales actually cause firms to cut 
the amount of their Loans (Panels B and D). 
  Second, those firms for which the recession caused a severe Sales drop in 1965 
did cut their Payables more than other firms:  the coefficients on Low and Very Low 
Sales Growth are significantly negative (Panels A.2 and C.2).  When interacted with 
actual sales levels (VLS * Sales Gr and LS * Sales Gr), the coefficients remain negative 
but are no longer uniformly significant.  Similar results follow from our regressions with 
the Inventory shock dummies (though not the interaction terms):  the coefficients on 
Low and Very Low Inventory are again negative (though not statistically significantly 
so).
14 
  Third, those firms that experienced dramatic growth in 1966 increased their 
Payables more than the others.  The High and Very High Sales Growth dummies in the 
1966 regressions cause a similar effect (Panels A.3 and C.3):  the coefficients are 
significantly positive, and remain significantly positive when interacted with sales levels 
(HS * Sales Gr and VHS * Sales Gr).   
  [Insert Table 10 about here.] 
  Last, the exogenous shocks did not affect the Growth in bank Loans (Panels B 
and D).  In all regressions on Loans, the coefficients on the shock dummies are either 
insignificant or in haphazard directions.    In 1965, for example, the Inventory and Sales 
shock dummies are all insignificant.  In 1966, either (a) the coefficients on the Inventory 
variable are positive while those on the sales growth dummies are negative, or (b) the 
coefficients on the Sales variable are negative while those on the inventory growth 
dummies are positive. 
 
  (c) Pooled data sets.  In addition to running the these regressions on the data from 
the three years separately, for Tables 11 and 12 we pool the data sets and run analogous 
regressions.  Table 11 replicates the first-differences regressions from Table 9, and Table 
12 replicates the difference-in-differences regressions from Table 10.  The last column on 
                     
14 We bring no priors to the question of whether inventory or sales are more appropriate as continuous and dummy 
variables.  We include the many permutations to Tables 9-12 only to show that they all generate roughly the same 
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Table 12 gives the combination of variables that explains a particularly large amount of 
the variation in the data.  Consistently, the results track those from the individual years:  
firms respond to financial exigencies by adjusting the amounts they borrow from their 
trade partners; they do not significantly change the amounts they borrow from banks.  
  [Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here.] 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
  Trade credit is not the desperate recourse of the embattled.  It is not the safety net 
for the small.  And it is not the province of firms in undeveloped financial markets.  
Instead, firms both large and small in modern developed economies use trade credit to 
raise substantial funds. 
  Neither is trade credit a premium source of funds.  Apparently, firms borrow from 
their trade partners at about the same interest rate (albeit an implicit rate) that banks 
charge.  Apparently, they borrow from their partners when those partners will lend most 
cheaply.  They borrow from banks when their partners will not. 
  Yet firms do not treat bank loans and trade credit interchangeably.  They borrow 
from banks when they anticipate needing the money for relatively long periods; they turn 
to trade partners when they face exigencies they did not expect.  They do not 
substantially change the amount of their loans in response to changes in their financial 
status; they do change the amount of their trade credit in response. 
  The different term structures of trade credit and bank loans follow from the 
fundamentally different way trade partners and bankers cut default risk.  A trade partner 
knows his borrower’s industry first hand.  To trade, he may even visit his borrower’s 
business regularly.  To reduce his default risk, he monitors his borrower’s activities.  
Because he incurs his monitoring expenses over time, he willingly lends short-term.   
  By contrast, although bankers may know how to run a heavily regulated financial 
intermediary, they know far less about the industries in which their borrowers compete.  
Banks simply do not have a comparative advantage in monitoring.  As a result, to cut 
their default risk they primarily lend to firms that can offer either third-party guarantees 
or security interests in property.  Because to establish these rights they incur substantial 
legal expenses at the outset, they lend for relatively long periods. 
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                 Employees 
                         All    50-     100-    200-   300-   500-    1000- 
    Firms  99  199  299   499   999    4999    ≥ 5000 
Current  Assets  58.3 66.2  65.6  64.3 61.6 58.6  55.8 56.8 
 Cash  &  deposits  13.3 20.3  20.0  19.1 17.7 15.7  13.3 9.9 
 Accounts  Receivable  23.6 22.2  22.6  22.4 21.7 20.8  22.3 25.6 
  Marketable  securities  1.0 1.1  1.0  1.0 0.8 0.6  0.8 1.2 
 Inventories  16.3 16.9  17.2  17.1 16.8 17.5  15.8 16.1 
  Other  4.1 5.7  4.8  4.7 4.6 4.0  3.6 4.0 
Fixed  Assets  41.2 33.3  34.0  35.3 37.9 41.0  43.7 42.6 
 Tangible  32.2 30.2  30.7  31.3 32.7 34.8  33.2 31.4 
  Intangible  9.0 3.1  3.3  4.0 5.2 6.2  10.5  11.2 
  Deferred  accounts  0.5 0.5  0.4  0.4 0.5 0.4  0.5 0.6 
 
Debt    73.8 78.3  78.8  76.8 76.0 76.1  72.8 72.2 
 Current  liabilities  52.1 63.7  62.4  60.1 57.5 56.3  51.2 47.6 
  Accounts  payable  23.0 35.8  36.6  34.4 31.4 28.3  21.4 17.5 
  Short-term  debt  18.5 17.2  16.3  16.4 16.1 18.1  20.4 18.5 
  Other  10.6 10.7  9.5  9.3  10.0 9.9  9.4  11.6 
 Fixed  liablities  21.7 14.6  16.4  16.7 18.5 19.8  21.6 24.6 
  Long-term  debt  16.2 12.9  14.3  14.5 16.0 16.0  16.9 16.6 
    Securities  2.6 0.0  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0  1.4 5.1 
    Other  2.9 1.7  2.0  2.2 2.5 3.8  3.3 2.9 








 Note:  Manufacturing firms only.  Sample construction described in 
text. 
 
 Source:  Nihon ginko, Kibo betsu kigyo keiei bunseki  [Analysis of 
Firm Management, by Firm Size] (Tokyo:  Nihon ginko, 1965) (fiscal year 
1964). Trade Credit:  Page 23 
Table 2:  Growth Rates (%) of Selected Financial Variables 
 
 
      Net  Operating           Recei-  Short-T  Long-T 
     Sales   Profits Inventory Payables  vables   Loans    Loans 
1961 21.7 10.6  26.0 29.8 29.6  27.7 28.0 
1962  8.6 -2.9  2.1 3.4 19.8  22.7  26.5 
1963 16.1 19.9  12.7 31.0 34.9  18.5 24.7 
1964 16.1 7.7 14.4 9.9  16.1  16.9 17.9 
1965  6.5 -2.5  3.4 3.8 6.6  13.9  13.5 
 
1966 16.4 27.5  9.7  17.6 12.6  5.2  4.0 
1967 20.4 29.3  23.0 21.1 18.4  11.1 17.8 
1968 16.7 15.7  13.7 15.8 16.6  11.7 23.1 
1969 20.8 25.0  20.3 26.7 25.0  13.0 21.8 
1970 16.8 8.7 22.8 12.5 16.8  17.2 24.7 
 
1971 5.7  -13.4  3.8  -1.1 4.1 16.6 24.2 
1972 11.9 21.0  6.2  20.8 9.6 10.7 6.6 
1973 31.3 62.0  47.5 52.8 27.7  16.3 9.5 
1974 22.7 -4.2  34.3 -1.8 9.2 30.0 18.2 
 
 Notes:  Manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees.  Trade 
credit excludes notes.  Sample construction described in text. 
 




- - - - - - - - - -  
 
Table 3:  1964 Accounts-Payable and Accounts-Receivable, 
by Firm Size (%) 
 
 
                 Employees 
                         All    50-     100-    200-   300-   500-    1000- 
    Firms  99  199  299   499   999    4999    ≥ 5000 
Receivables/Payables  154.7 128.7  123.4  128.1 128.6 129.1  156.8 186.6 
Receivables/Sales  36.1 27.5  30.1  31.9 33.3 31.6  36.8 42.1 
Payables/Sales  23.3 21.4  24.4  24.9 35.9 24.5  23.5 22.5 
 
 
 Notes:  Receivables include notes discounted with banks; 
receivables in Table 1 exclude discounted notes.  Manufacturing firms 
only.  Sample construction described in text. 
 
 Source:  see Table 1. Trade Credit:  Page 24 
Table 4:  Trade Credit in Selected Industries, 
1964-66 Averages, by Firm Size (%) 
 
 
             Employees 
   50-  100- 200-  300- 500- 1000-  
    99  199 299  499 999 4999 ≥5000 
A.  Discounted Notes/All Notes 
 Textiles  78.5  77.0 76.4  72.0 77.6 65.8  49.7 
 Chemicals  63.4  62.8 61.3  64.3 64.0 53.7  55.5 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  72.6  75.7 75.4  74.6 75.8 70.1  60.2 
 Machinery  70.1  71.1 57.8  53.6 53.6 46.6  27.8 
 Electrical  Equipment  78.8  73.4 73.6  74.5 74.5 54.6  40.5 
 Transportation  Equip.  67.8  62.7 63.4  52.7 52.7 41.8  19.6 
 
B.  Receivables (A)/Sales 
 Textiles  29.3  27.9 29.9  27.0 28.0 30.0  30.0 
 Chemicals  33.2  36/8 39.1  37.7 37.5 40.6  42.1 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  32.9  34.7 35.6  35.7 32.8 38.3  33.0 
 Machinery  36.3  40.8 45.0  46.5 52.3 52.7  65.2 
 Electrical  Equipment  29.3  29.2 29.1  30.5 34.1 41.5  46.6 
 Transportation  Equip.  29.1  31.0 30.6  33.0 39.7 41.5  56.3 
 
C.  Receivables (B)/Sales 
 Textiles  10.9  11.6 11.8  12.4 11.5 15.6  18.7 
 Chemicals  18.1  20.6 21.6  20.6 21.3 25.2  26.9 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  15.2  15.8 16.9  16.2 15.2 20.4  20.5 
 Machinery  18.6  21.4 27.7  29.9 35.2 39.2  55.7 
 Electrical  Equipment  15.3  17.3 17.6  17.7 20.7 30.1  38.0 
 Transportation  Equip.  17.4  18.5 18.9  22.7 27.3 32.5  51.4 
 
D.  Payables/Sales 
 Textiles  21.9  21.9 23.5  22.8 22.6 22.7  19.1 
 Chemicals  36.5  28.3 26.4  25.8 25.8 26.4  27.3 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  31.3  31.0 30.4  32.4 30.9 29.6  20.0 
 Machinery  25.4  28.3 28.1  28.8 30.5 27.2  27.1 
 Electrical  Equipment  22.2  24.4 26.9  26.1 27.4 27.9  21.3 
 Transportation  Equip.  23.9  28.2 31.3  36.5 36.0 30.6  24.4 
 
E.  Receivables (A)/Payables 
 Textiles  133.5 127.6  127.5 118.3  124.0  132.3 157.0 
 Chemicals  112.9 130.1  147.9 146.5  146.3  154.4 154.8 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  105.6 112.1  117.0 110.3  106.0  129.5 165.0 
 Machinery  143.2 144.3  160.7 161.8  172.1  194.5 240.5 
 Electrical  Equipment  132.1 119.9  108.4 117.2  124.5  148.8 218.8 
 Transportation  Equip.  123.6 113.6  101.2 105.1  118.3  140.1 234.8 
 
F.  Receivables (B)/Payables 
 Textiles  49.5  53.0 50.3  54.5 51.0 69.0  97.8 
 Chemicals  60.6  73.0 81.7  80.0 83.0 95.9  98.7 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  48.0  51.2 55.6  50.4 49.1 68.8  102.9 
 Machinery  73.4  75.9 98.6  104.1  115.8  144.9 205.5 
 Electrical  Equipment  69.4  70.9 65.6  68.0 75.7 108.1 178.4 
 Transportation  Equip.  73.1  67.4 61.6  71.4 80.0 109.5 213.6 
 
Table continued on next pageTrade Credit:  Page 25 




             Employees 
   50-  100- 200-  300- 500- 1000-  
    99  199 299  499 999 4999 ≥5000 
G.  Payables/Loans 
 Textiles  127.3 90.3 85.5  86.6 68.7 62.4  54.0 
 Chemicals  146.5 129.4  128.1 99.5 72.0 52.3  45.3 
  Iron & Non-Ferr. Metals  245.4  191.2  166.6  144.1  139.3  72.1  42.6 
 Machinery  100.9 110.9  81.6  79.4 81.9 63.7  69.9 
 Electrical  Equipment  140.6 139.8  150.3 151.4  128.7  88.0  53.9 
 Transportation  Equip.  110.3 143.4  151.3 172.9  124.6  87.0  47.0 
 
H.  Inventories/Payables 
 Textiles  62.2  67.9 64.7  60.1 79.6 94.5  114.0 
 Chemicals  36.1  42.9 45.7  53.9 55.9 50.5  57.9 
 Iron  &  Non-Ferr.  Metals  28.1  28.5 40.4  42.1 49.5 68.6  111.7 
 Machinery  45.3  52.4 61.4  72.0 76.7 82.1  74.4 
 Electrical  Equipment  42.2  51.7 49.3  55.8 60.8 82.9  108.4 






    Notes:  Receivables (A) include notes discounted with banks.  Receivables (B) 
exclude discounted notes.  Sample construction described in text. 
 
    Source:  See Table 1 (various years). 
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Table 5:  Days Sales Outstanding and Days Payables Outstanding, 
by Industry, Decade, and Stated Capital 
 
 
            Stated Capital 
     All firms   .       <¥1x10
8    .      ¥1-10x10
8  .      >¥10x10
8   . 
  1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990-  
  1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000  
A.  Days Sales Outstanding 
All  indusries  59.6 57.8 60.1 48.1 49.9 50.3 62.5 65.6 71.2 74.6 66.1 70.8 
Manufacturing  68.0 66.9 75.9 49.6 57.2 66.0 61.2 65.2 75.9 86.6 75.4 82.3 
Non-manufac'g  54.8 53.6 54.9 47.5 47.7 46.5 63.4 65.9 69.5 64.6 59.2 62.9 
 
Foods  34.3 38.4 44.9 33.5 356.9  42.6 32.8 40.5 47.6 36.3 40.3 46.2 
Textiles  47.1 61.2 82.6 43.8 57.34  73.7 40.1 57.9 85.1 57.3 74.6 99.4 
Clothing    57.1 65.5   54.1 58.3   69.9 80.9   74.6 94.7 
Lumber    62.2 67.9   60.5 63.8   70.7 78.9   72.5 81.7 
Paper  53.9 67.1 84.8 53.1 62.9 71.4 49.7 63.3 82.3 57.2 73.2 98.5 
Printing    59.4 69.7   56.2 65.6   52.1 57.5   87.5 97.2 
Chemicals  72.6 83.9 103.6  64.5 69.5 83.0 71.76  81.6 99.5 75.1 88.8 109.0 
Petrochem.    64.5 55.2   59.8 69.8   61.0 58.6   64.8 54.5 
Ceramics  64.4 73.7 87.1 53.9 66.6 74.1 64.5 76.8 98.3 76.4 83.5 100.8 
Iron  58.9 62.0 79.7 52.3 56.8 70.4 49.6 57.4 85.2 62.0 64.3 81.9 
Non-ferr.  metals 67.0 65.3 89.3 53.0 51.3 68.1 60.5 48.8 79.5 78.3 75.8 97.2 
Metal  pdts  53.2 65.4 83.1 50.5 61.1 72.4 58.7 71.8 94.9 64.9 82.3 110.6 
Machinery  94.8 97.8 107.8  65.2 74.3 79.8 98.9 98.6 114.1  140.8  125.7  133.8 
Elec.  mach.  87.4 68.8 75.1 54.8 53.0 62.9 73.5 62.9 68.0 101.8  76.4 80.4 
Transp.  equip.  95.0 57.1 55.9 55.9 49.9 58.4 69.4 54.4 61.3 111.3  59.3 54.8 
Precision  mach.  12.8 65.9 79.8 10.7 58.2 73.2 13.5 65.6 84.3 16.1 76.0 82.8 
Shipbuilding  222.6 160.7 108.9 115.4 102.1 74.2  176.9 156.6 65.7  241.9 171.2 119.0 
Other  manuf.  54.2 62.9 80.3 47.63  57.8 69.0 56.3 68.8 82.4 68.5 76.4 100.4 
  
Agriculture,  F&F 29.9 30.8 34.9 20.7 26.1 30.9 39.2 45.2 41.6 39.6 42.7 49.8 
Mining  52.7 59.1 63.3 51.3 60.1 71.7 46.6 51.3 62.7 54.6 59.2 46.1 
Construction  44.3 57.2 63.4 34.0 44.6 50.2 56.4 65.8 76.5 59.5 87.7 93.0 
Wholesale  65.2 60.8 63.6 56.9 59.0 62.1 73.5 70.0 78.6 75.2 59.8 58.5 
Retail  30.3 30.2 29.8 31.6 28.6 29.4 29.9 43.0 40.7 20.9 26.0 23.8 
Real  estate  46.2 40.6 40.5 32.4 36.3 36.3 67.2 49.3 45.0 59.8 55.6 48.9 
Transp.  &  comm.  35.4 38.5 44.5 36.3 39.6 45.1 39.6 44.9 46.4 31.9 34.1 42.8 
Electricity  14.2 17.7 18.6 13.7 18.3 24.0 44.1 30.3 29.0 14.2 17.7 18.6 
Gas  &  water  18.8 26.4 32.1 37.1 32.6 34.1 28.5 28.0 34.2 17.1 25.9 31.8 
Service  39.8 60.6 63.7 31.9 36.2 31.8 48.3 105.1  89.6 97.0 160.0  166.3 
 
B.  Days Payable Outstanding 
All  indusries  65.5 59.2 52.1 64.0 58.1 49.7 74.2 69.5 62.7 64.1 56.7 51.3 
Manufacturing  67.8 64.4 57.7 64.8 62.0 54.9 78.5 71.7 65.3 67.0 64.2 57.6 
Non-manufac'g  64.2 56.9 49.8 63.7 56.9 48.4 71.4 68.4 61.8 61.7 51.2 47.0 
 
Foods  39.2 37.1 31.6 36.7 35.1 33.2 47.1 42.4 36.0 38.9 37.2 28.9 
Textiles  68.0 70.0 60.4 70.2 67.3 60.0 76.4 76.0 69.9 59.6 74.6 58.4 
Clothing    64.8 56.1   63.7 52.7   83.2 73.2   57.7 61.2 
Lumber    78.0 71.8   74.3 68.5   95.3 80.6   100.4  84.4 
Paper  85.2 80.4 69.5 88.7 78.4 70.6 95.8 95.0 80.7 76.7 76.4 65.4 
 
Table continued on next page.Trade Credit:  Page 27 




            Stated Capital 
     All firms   .       <¥1x10
8    .      ¥1-10x10
8  .      >¥10x10
8   . 
  1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990-  
  1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000  
Printing    51.8 53.7   50.1 50.6   45.5 47.4   70.8 69.9 
Chemicals  75.3 72.0 62.1 77.4 69.9 64.2 82.3 74.9 66.6 72.9 72.1 60.7 
Petrochem.    53.6 36.5   62.5 52.6   61.7 49.1   53.0 35.4 
Ceramics  63.3 70.3 65.7 64.9 73.8 68.6 71.7 79.0 76.0 56.6 60.6 57.5 
Iron  78.7 79.9 65.0 81.5 76.4 63.9 95.9 93.0 77.0 76.2 78.8 63.4 
Non-ferr.  metals 83.1 72.0 57.9 82.7 67.0 58.5 93.2 61.4 72.4 79.1 77.4 54.5 
Metal  pdts  71.9 70.8 63.2 66.2 64.7 56.4 91.7 91.9 80.6 81.5 80.9 74.6 
Machinery  80.3 78.7 75.2 73.1 71.4 62.8 95.0 89.2 89.7 83.9 83.4 83.1 
Elec.  mach.  69.4 60.5 59.2 67.8 55.4 50.4 85.4 71.0 66.7 67.0 60.5 60.4 
Transp.  equip.  64.0 54.2 51.4 71.2 59.1 52.7 79.7 65.3 62.1 58.9 51.4 49.8 
Precision  mach.  13.1 63.2 65.5 12.2 57.8 53.1 13.9 65.3 68.1 14.3 68.8 72.9 
Shipbuilding  87.1 92.3 92.9 87.4 86.0 68.2 119.6  120.7  88.2 84.1 88.9 97.1 
Other  manuf.  64.4 69.6 62.9 64.0 656.9  58.5 70.4 78.2 69.8 62.5 75.3 67.3 
  
Agriculture,  F&F 57.1 55.7 51.5 56.2 60.3 57.6 61.3 58.5 43.4 57.2 39.8 28.3 
Mining  60.5 55.9 51.3 68.3 73.7 66.3 54.6 46.7 48.3 59.3 32.4 20.2 
Construction  57.3 63.6 63.0 53.5 53.2 49.3 65.1 77.5 78.6 56.9 85.6 92.7 
Wholesale  72.8 64.8 60.8 71.8 68.4 64.7 80.5 77.9 75.1 71.1 54.1 48.3 
Retail  47.6 43.2 39.5 49.9 43.8 38.8 49.8 50.1 45.0 26.2 34.4 37.7 
Real  estate  54.6 51.7 55.5 48.1 49.3 65.0 69.1 61.5 37.2 56.2 53.1 45.0 
Transp.  &  comm.  47.2 36.9 33.6 60.0 41.4 37.6 46.3 39.9 37.3 32.5 39.2 28.6 
Electricity  13.0 15.7 10.0 7.1  2.1  11.4 83.2 70.7 21.3 12.8 15.7 10.0 
Gas  &  water  34.6 21.8 17.2 64.3 46.3 40.1 64.4 38.4 35.0 30.7 18.8 13.6 






 Note:  DSO = 365*Receivables/Sales; DPO = 365*Payables/Sales.  
Figures give mean of values for beginning and end of period.  
Receivables exclude discounted notes. 
 
 Source:  Okura sho, Hojin kigyo tokei nempo [Annual Statistics on 
Corporations] (Tokyo:  Okura sho, various dates).   Trade Credit:  Page 28 
Table 6:  Receivables/Payables, 
by Industry, Decade, and Stated Capital 
 
 
            Stated Capital 
     All firms   .       <¥1x10
8    .      ¥1-10x10
8  .      >¥10x10
8   . 
  1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990- 1960- 1975- 1990-  
  1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000 1974 1989 2000  
All indusries  123.8 123.8 129.3 105.8 114.6 120.5 120.6 123.5 125.0 152.4 137.8 143.3 
Manufacturing  147.2 140.3 150.3 127.1 141.0 157.3 127.5 130.4 135.2 173.9 143.2 150.6 
Non-manufac'g  109.8 115.2 119.8 97.1  105.5 110.5 115.9 120.2 121.2 132.2 132.9 137.1 
 
Foods  118.2 125.4 152.5 124.5 124.8 144.7 100.9 119.7 141.7 122.6 130.5 165.1 
Textiles  131.1 157.0 185.6 129.3 164.8 189.0 113.3 135.6 162.5 148.4 152.4 192.0 
Clothing    135.2 146.0   134.3 144.3   124.8 140.5   162.8 167.0 
Lumber    128.3 132.5   129.6 134.8   124.2 132.6   125.3 122.3 
Paper  129.0 133.3 148.2 120.0 129.1 136.7 124.4 119.8 133.8 144.1 145.5 165.2 
Printing    142.7 146.7   144.1 154.6   135.6 132.6   148.2 145.3 
Chemicals  150.8 155.7 181.3 131.1 140.3 158.7 137.5 151.3 168.4 160.9 161.6 189.6 
Petrochem.    130.1 152.9   127.6 148.8   127.4 130.2   130.5 154.5 
Ceramics  152.9 154.2 163.5 134.1 137.1 148.2 144.0 151.9 161.4 187.3 188.9 191.3 
Iron  141.4 125.7 146.8 123.8 133.1 162.3 106.9 111.6 137.0 153.9 127.4 144.4 
Non-ferr. metals  134.9 140.0 174.0 119.3 135.5 162.1 120.0 135.5 141.2 156.5 143.6 187.4 
Metal pdts  128.2 144.2 170.6 130.8 150.6 180.3 115.9 123.6 146.8 140.2 145.9 164.1 
Machinery  166.0 166.7 168.6 145.6 161.3 173.7 154.2 151.7 153.7 203.1 178.9 170.5 
Elec. mach.  162.2 135.1 135.1 126.9 140.6 155.9 126.4 115.1 110.5 183.9 137.9 135.7 
Transp. equip.  173.4 120.5 115.7 125.4 126.1 139.0 125.8 112.5 109.3 204.7 121.2 112.6 
Precision mach.  40.0  146.4 163.5 39.1  155.5 183.6 39.8  137.7 145.9 41.5  141.2 159.8 
Shipbuilding  263.0 181.5 119.4 157.2 146.9 131.4 165.0 140.4 82.4  292.9 196.9 122.2 
Other manuf.  127.1 136.3 155.1 119.8 135.5 155.6 134.1 140.0 143.8 143.3 137.4 161.6 
  
Agriculture,  F&F 79.0 67.9 73.8 50.5 51.4 59.5 123.0  109.6  105.5  110.4  135.0  185.8 
Mining  146.4 148.1 160.4 117.2 130.7 148.9 156.0 156.1 161.8 161.7 229.3 242.1 
Construction  97.8  103.3 109.6 83.1  102.5 116.5 104.1 98.1  103.5 129.9 106.6 102.2 
Wholesale  117.0 119.6 118.4 105.8 113.1 114.9 122.3 119.5 116.9 134.3 132.3 126.5 
Retail  71.1 75.0 78.3 71.1 70.5 80.1 65.0 91.3 91.2 79.9 78.0 62.8 
Real  estate  85.5 89.2 97.5 69.1 87.2 97.7 98.6 86.9 126.4  171.9  110.9  107.0 
Transp. & comm.  93.6  123.3 142.6 78.9  119.8 136.5 106.0 128.6 129.8 116.2 126.9 153.1 
Electricity  113.7 129.3 188.0 14.3  685.6 212.6 383.5 41.6  157.1 114.4 129.4 188.1 
Gas  &  water  73.7 128.4  197.9  64.8 74.6 88.1 54.0 80.3 101.9  78.0 145.3  253.0 






 Note:  Figures give mean of values for beginning and end of period. 
Receivables include discounted notes. 
 
 Source:  Okura sho, Hojin kigyo tokei nempo [Annual Statistics on 
Corporations] (Tokyo:  Okura sho, various dates).   
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Table 7:  Bank Loans and Note Discounts, 
Effective Mean Annual Interest Rates (%), 1956-1965 
 
          Bank          Note    
                         Loans             Discounts        . 
1956 8.39  8.53 
1957 8.33  8.57 
1958 8.42  8.72 
1959 8.08  8.20 
1960 8.15  8.21 
1961 8.01  7.96 
1962 8.19  8.26 
1963 7.81  7.73 
1964 7.91  7.87 
1965 7.83  7.73 
1966 7.56  7.30 
1967 7.41  7.11 
1968 7.51  7.34 
1969 7.48  7.23 
1970 7.71  7.53 
 
 Notes:  Simple average of monthly average interest rates at all 
banks, calculated as weighted average of agreed-upon interest rates on 
loans and discounts.   
 
 Source:  Nihon ginko, Honpo keizai tokei [Economic 
Statistics of Japan] (Tokyo:  Nihon ginko tokei kyoku, 
various years). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Table 8:  Coefficient of Variation in Growth Rates of 
in Payables and Short-Term Loans, 1961-1974 
 
No.                 Coefficient of Variation in Growth Rates 
employees               Payables        Short-term loans 
50-99 .64  .22 
100-199 .75  .32 
200-299 .79  .31 
300-499 .77  .33 
500-999 .79  .28 
1000-4999 .85  .39 
5000- .85  .45 
 
 Notes:  Variance in the data used to produce Figures 1 and 2.  
Payables include notes. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1 (various years).Trade Credit:  Page 30 
Table 9:  The Effect of Changes in Firm Financial Status on Changes in 
Trade Credit and Bank Loans -- First Differences, 1964-66 
 
   1964   1965   1966  1964   1965   1966  1964   1965   1966  . 
A.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Growth): 
Inventory  (Gr)  .289 .357 .609    .302 .357  .501 .440  .443  .700 
  (4.52) (3.74) (7.37)  (3.75) (3.75)  (6.30) (6.86)  (4.66)  (11.79) 
Sales  (Gr)  .652   .378  .256 .654  .395 .678     
  (5.13) (2.98) (1.57)  (5.15) (3.57)  (6.48) 
Income (Gr)  .014   .010   .128        .015  .061  .177 
  (0.96) (0.28) (3.26)        (0.93)  (1.87)  (7.33) 
Constant  -.735 2.911 -.161    -.647 2.818  -2.621  5.766  6.455  1.483 
  (0.48) (1.65) (0.11)  (0.42) (1.63)  (2.04) (5.97)  (4.75)  (1.50) 
Adjusted  R2 .50 .29 .76  .50 .29  .73 .36  .22  .75 
 
B.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Growth): 
Inventory  (Gr)  .041 .018 .041    -.001  .020  .220 .108  .118  .150 
  (0.37) (0.11) (0.51)  (0.01) (0.12)  (2.61) (1.09)  (0.74)  (2.58) 
Sales  (Gr)  .288 .441 .306    .281 .247  -.390   
  (1.31) (2.04) (1.93)  (1.26) (1.28)  (3.51) 
Income (Gr)  -.044  -.113  -.211        -.044    -.054  -.153 
  (1.82) (1.86) (5.54)        (1.79)  (0.99)  (6.48) 
Constant  10.766 7.294  11.215  10.477 8.354 15.276 13.635  11.430  13.185 
  (4.07) (2.42) (8.03)  (3.92) (2.78)  (11.17)  (9.19)  (5.04)  (13.62) 
Adjusted  R2 .03 .03 .32  .00 .00  .10 .02  -.01 .30 
 
C.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Normalized Change): 
Inventory(NorCh).592 .825 .625  .672 .858  .631 .700  1.064 1.108   
  (4.71) (4.40) (4.72)  (5.68) (4.51)  (4.45) (5.20)  (5.38)  (8.25) 
Sales (Nor Ch)  .139  .109  .174   .157  .126  .224 
  (4.31) (4.45) (5.90)  (5.15) (5.36)  (10.06) 
Income (Nor Ch) .294  .248  .418         .545  .436  1.105 
  (1.72) (1.98) (2.44)        (3.10)  (3.37)  (7.54) 
1/Assets  -12.883 -15.439 4.136  -14.350 -.15.697 4.787 -15.340  -16.008  -6.907 
  (1.82)  (2.22)  (0.56)  (2.02)  (2.23) (0.63) (1.98)  (2.10)  (0.83) 
Constant  8.090  69.703  -57.976 -18.050 59.767 -96.797 247.045 206.111  102.515 
  (0.12)  (1.43)  (1.37)  (0.27)  (1.21) (2.41) (6.11)  (4.95)  (2.71) 
Adjusted  R2 .51 .47 .81  .50 .45  .80 .41  .36  .74 
  
D.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Normalized Change): 
Inventory  (NC)  .084  .329  .311 -.034 .288 .354  .143  .422  .393 
  (0.57) (1.13) (2.20)  (0.25) (0.98)  (2.25) (0.98)  (1.51)  (3.35) 
Sales  (Nor  Ch)  .076 .043 .031  .049 .022  -.069 
  (2.04) (1.12) (1.04)  (1.35) (0.62)  (2.78)      
Income (Nor Ch) -.436  -.308  -.848        -.298  -.234  -.725 
  (2.18) (1.59) (4.85)        (1.56)  (1.28)  (5.66) 
1/Assets  -10.910  7.728  -1.028  -8.732 8.048 -2.348 -12.265 7.505  -3.009 
  (1.32) (0.72) (0.14)  (1.04) (0.74)  (0.28) (1.46)  (0.70)  (0.14) 
Constant  343.462  220.756  337.214 382.229   233.096 416.016  475.314  274.176  365.999 
  (4.41) (2.92) (7.82)  (4.94) (3.08)  (9.32) (10.82) (4.66)  (11.10) 
Adjusted  R2 .04 .01 .24  .00 -.01  .05 .01  .01  .24 
     
 Notes:  The table gives the coefficient, followed by the absolute value of 
the t-statistic in parenthesis below it.  For database construction, see text. 
 
 Source:  See table 1 (various years). Trade Credit:  Page 31 
Table 10:  The Effect of Unanticipated Economic Shocks on Trade Credit  





A.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Growth): 
 
1.  1964                           . 
Inventory (Gr)  .455     
 (7.32)     
Sales (Gr)    0.946   
   (7.58)   
Constant  5.884  -1.114   
  (6.15) (0.66)  
Adjusted  R2 .36 .38  
 
 
2.  1965                                                                                 . 
Inventory  (Gr)  .472 .442 .415  .473 .457 
  (4.97) (4.90) (4.66)  (4.99) (4.86) 
Sales  (Gr)         .536  .491  .467  .519  .545 
         (4.82)  (4.36)  (4.02)  (4.72)  (4.88) 
VL  Inven  (Gr)          -3.991 
          (1.78) 
L  Inven  Gr           -3.492   
           (1.83) 
VLI  *  Inv  Gr             .796 
             (1.92) 
LI  *  Inv  Gr                 .277 
               (0.99) 
VL Sales Gr    -7.024 
   (3.44) 
L Sales Gr      -6.991 
    (4.03) 
VLS * Sales Gr        -.430 
      (1.07) 
LS * Sales Gr          -.498 
       (1.90) 
Constant  6.99  8.663 9.695  7.318 8.016  4.820 6.154 6.884  5.353  4.568 
  (5.18) (6.35) (6.84)  (5.30) (5.58)  (2.75) (3.26) (3.33)  (3.06)  (2.58) 
Adjusted  R2 .20 .29 .32  .20 .23  .19 .21 .21  .22  .19 
 
Table continued on next page.Trade Credit:  Page 32 




3.  1966                                                                                 . 
Inven  (Gr)  .853 .755 .802  .751 .799   
  (12.27) (9.35)  (11.07 (9.49)  (11.10)  
Sales  (Gr)         1.129  .964  .992  .941  .983 
         (12.44)  (9.22)  (9.96)  (9.13)  (9.97) 
H  Inven  Gr          6.093 
          (2.89) 
VH  Inven  Gr           6.578 
           (2.87) 
HI  *  Inv  Gr             .236 
             (3.34) 
VHI  *  Inv  Gr               .221 
               (3.12) 
H Sales Gr    4.74 
   (2.28) 
VH Sales Gr      4.574 
    (2.13) 
HS * Sales Gr        .205 
      (2.51) 
VHS * Sales Gr          .186 
       (2.31) 
Constant  2.43  2.15  2.129 2.097  2.09  -2.556 -2.006 -1.928  -1.867  -1.878 
  (1.98) (0.63) (1.75)  (1.74) (1.73)  (1.67) (1.35) (1.29)  (1.27)  (1.27) 
Adjusted  R2 .61 .63 .63  .64 .63  .62 .65 .65  .66  .65 
 
 
B.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Growth): 
1.  1964                          . 
Inventory (Gr)  .064     
 (0.59)     
Sales (Gr)    0.280   
   (1.44)   
Constant  13.285 10.479  
  (8.92) (2.65)  
Adjusted  R2 -.01  .01  
 
Table continued on next page.
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2.  1965                                                                                 . 
Inventory  (Gr)  .092 .079 .092  .094 .096 
  (0.59) (0.59) (0.58)  (0.60) (0.61) 
Sales  (Gr)         .255  .250  .259  .266  .250 
         (1.42)  (1.34)  (1.35)  (1.47)  (1.38) 
VL  Inven  Gr          -.529 
          (0.14) 
L  Inven  Gr           .191 
           (0.06) 
VLI  *  Inv  Gr             -.503 
             (0.74) 
LI  *  Inv  Gr               -.162 
               (0.35) 
VL Sales Gr    -2.981 
   (0.84) 
L Sales Gr      -.048 
    (0.02) 
VLS * Sale Gr        -.611 
      (0.92) 
LS * Sales Gr          .106 
       (0.24) 
Constant  10.965  11.677 10.983 11.437  10.745 8.468  8.645  8.355  8.131  8.615 
  (4.95) (4.91) (4.34)  (5.02) (4.47)  (2.98) (2.78) 2.45  (2.82)  (2.99) 
Adjusted  R2 -.01  .01 -.02  -.01  -.02  .01 .00 .00  .01  .00 
 
 
3.  1966                                                                                 . 
Inven  (Gr)  .017 .074 .072  .082 .072   
  (0.26) (0.97) (1.07)  (1.09) (1.06) 
Sales  (Gr)         -.192  -.325  -.287  -.328  -.284 
         (2.30)  (3.25)  (3.06)  (3.39)  (3.05) 
H  Inven  Gr          4.914 
          (2.51) 
VH  Inven  Gr           4.524 
           (2.11) 
HI  *  Inv  Gr             .171 
             (2.56) 
VHI  *  Inv  Gr               .140 
               (2.08) 
H Sales Gr    -2.753 
   (1.39) 
VH Sales Gr      -4.881 
    (2.44) 
HS * Sale Gr        -.130 
      (1.66) 
VHS * Sal Gr          -.186 
       (2.47) 
Constant  12.368  12.527 12.686  12.577 12.699  15.304 15.748 15.736  15.802 15.731 
  (10.73) (10.87) (11.22)(10.95)(11.24) (10.86)(11.39)(11.25)(11.43)  (11.24) 
Adjusted  R2 -.01  0  .04  .01 .04  .04 .08 .1 .08  .1 
 
Table continued on next page.
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C.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Normalized Change): 
1.  1964                           . 
Inven (NorCh)  .898     
 (7.23)     
Sales (NorCh)    .222   
   (6.74)   
1/Asset -19.117  -5.759   
  (2.39) (0.71)  
Constant  260.223 -33.953  
  (6.18) (0.45)  
Adjusted  R2 .36 .33  
 
 
2.  1965                                                                                  . 
Inven  (NorCh) 1.200 1.087 1.040  1.189 1.156 
  (5.88) (5.59) (5.45)  (5.87) (5.77) 
Sales  (NorCh)         .162  .153  .145  .159  .164 
         (6.63)  (6.19)  (5.63)  (6.61)  (6.67) 
VL  Inven  Gr          -102.461 
          (1.60) 
L  Inven  Gr           -101.249 
           (1.85) 
VLI  *  Inv  Gr             21.103 
             (1.79) 
LI  *  Inv  Gr               6.473 
               (0.80) 
VL Sales Gr    -221.552 
   (3.64) 
L Sales Gr      -221.357 
    (4.31) 
VLS * Sale Gr        -19.086 
      (1.61) 
LS * Sales Gr          -18.257 
       (2.37) 
1/Asset  -16.690  -19.744  -19.322 -17.349 -16.965 -15.869 -15.055  -15.760 -15.167 -15.439 
  (2.07) (2.60)  (2.61) (2.17)  (2.16) (2.04)  (1.95)  (2.06) (1.97) (1.98) 
Constant  227.205 293.325 322.603  245.957  265.999  122.399 153.361 183.064  132.430  113.758 
  (5.23) (6.57)  (7.09) (5.51)  (5.81) (2.35)  (2.78)  (3.00) (2.56) (2.14) 
Adjusted  R2 .29 .37 .40  .30 .32  .34 .35 .35  .35  .33 
 
Table continued on next page.
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3.  1966                                                                                  . 
Inven  (NorCh) 1.639 1.255 1.455  1.250 1.449   
  (11.31) (7.67)  (9.78) (7.82)  (9.83) 
Sales  (NorCh)         .294  .267  .275  .262  .271 
         (17.01)  (12.46)  (13.24)(12.19)(13.14) 
H  Inven  Gr          122.502 
          (2.04) 
VH  Inven  Gr           103.848 
           (1.55) 
HI  *  Inv  Gr             4.969 
             (2.42) 
VHI  *  Inv  Gr               4.050 
               (1.94) 
H Sales Gr    293.701 
   (4.08) 
VH Sales Gr      245.393 
    (3.26) 
HS * Sale Gr        12.300 
      (4.35) 
VHS * Sal Gr          9.793 
       (3.47) 
1/Asset  -19.079 -8.281  -11.290 -7.259 -10.698 11.954 9.021  11.54  9.559  11.763 
  (1.84) (0.83) (1.11)  (0.74) (1.06)  (1.47) (1.11) (1.43)  (1.20)  (1.43) 
Constant  134.344  97.140  105.251 92.730  102.717 -101.771 -84.833 -89.414 -81.661 -86.784 
  (2.82) (2.16) (2.28)  (2.08) (2.24)  (2.31) (1.92) (2.01)  (1.87)  (1.97) 




D.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Normalized Change): 
 
1.  1964                           . 
Inven (NorCh)  .036     
 (0.27)     
Sales (NorCh)    .045   
   (1.36)   
1/Assets  10.204 -9.170  
  (1.22) (1.12)  
Constant  468.121 383.040  
 (10.63)  (4.98)   
Adjusted  R2 -.01  .01  
 
Table continued on next page.
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Table 10 (Cont'd) 
 
 
2.  1965                                                                                  . 
Inven  (NorCh)  .349 .334 .360  .339 .348 
  (1.27) (1.20) (1.28)  (1.24) (1.26) 
Sales  (NorCh)         .034  .025  .022  .034  .036 
         (1.01)  (0.71)  (0.61)  (0.98)  (1.06) 
VL  Inven  Gr          -119.080 
          (1.33) 
L  Inven  Gr           -72.182 
           (0.93) 
VLI  *  Inv  Gr             7.411 
             (0.44) 
LI  *  Inv  Gr               4.995 
               (0.44) 
VL Sales Gr    -29.094 
   (0.33) 
L Sales Gr      15.638 
    (0.21) 
VLS * Sale Gr        -15.119 
      (0.94) 
LS * Sales Gr          -.289 
       (0.03) 
1/Assets  7.871 7.470 8.057  7.349 7.867  7.990 8.936 8.067  8.236  8.321 
  (0.73) (0.68) (0.74)  (0.68) (0.72)  (0.74) (0.82) (0.74)  (0.75)  (0.76) 
Constant  262.856  271.539  256.117 277.711   263.469 254.114  290.098  297.363 257.637 247.446 
  (4.51) (4.23) (3.82)  (4.59) (4.19)  (3.50) (3.75) (3.63)  (3.51)  (3.32) 
Adjusted  R2 .00 -.01  -.01  .00 -.01  -.01  .00 -.01  .02  -.01 
 
Table continued on next page.
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3.  1966                                                                                . 
Inven  (NorCh)  .045 .182 .153  .191 .151 
  (0.39) (1.30) (1.26)  (1.39) (1.24) 
Sales  (NorCh)         -.029  -.059  -.056  -.063  -.058 
         (1.64)  (2.65)  (2.67)  (2.86)  (2.73) 
H  Inven  Gr          134.682 
          (2.17) 
VH  Inven  Gr           155.427 
           (2.28) 
HI  *  Inv  Gr             5.264 
             (2.48) 
VHI  *  Inv  Gr               5.051 
               (2.37) 
H Sales Gr    -104.818 
   (1.71) 
VH Sales Gr      -144.830 
    (2.36) 
HS * Sale Gr        -4.629 
      (1.91) 
VHS * Sal Gr          -5.447 
       (2.35) 
1/Assets  4.970 1.117 .374 .523  .309 1.672 -1.553  1.051  -.866  1.434 
  (0.60) (0.13) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.04)  (0.20) (0.19) (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.18) 
Constant  345.132  358.410  362.302 360.792   362.724 413.226   431.849  431.721 434.531 431.918 
  (9.11) (9.35) (9.61)  (9.43) (9.61)  (9.07) (9.49) (9.53)  (9.62)  (9.56) 



















 Notes:  The table gives the coefficient, followed by the absolute value of 
the t-statistic in parenthesis immediately below.  For database construction, see 
text. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1 (various years). Trade Credit:  Page 38 
Table 11:  Firm Financial Status,  
Trade Credit, and Bank Loans:   
First Differences, 1964-1966 Pooled Database 
 
 
A.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Growth)    
Inventory (Gr)  0.405(9.06) 0.408(9.10) 0.579(13.23) 
Sales (Gr)  0.560(8.20) 0.599(9.38)  
Income (Gr)  0.021(1.60) 0.060(4.39) 
const  -0.426(0.50) -0.643(0.76) 4.474(6.61) 
   
Adjusted R2  0.56 0.56 0.46 
   
B.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Growth)    
Inventory (Gr)  0.059(0.88) 0.049(0.71) 0.104(1.74) 
Sales (Gr)  0.142(1.38) -0.005(0.05)  
Income (Gr)  -0.079(3.96) -0.069(3.71) 
const  11.531(8.95) 12.344(9.46) 12.778(13.88) 
   
Adjusted R2  0.05 0.00  0.04 
   
C.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Normalized Change) 
Inventory (Nor Ch)  0.679(8.72) 0.740(9.46) 0.927(11.07) 
Sales (Nor Ch)  0.143(9.32) 0.169(11.96)  
Income (Nor Ch)  0.335(3.87) 0.688(7.74) 
1/Asset  -11.326(2.77) -12.335(2.95) -15.667(3.37) 
const  8.314(0.29) -16.820(0.59) 199.104(8.62) 
   
Adjusted R2  0.64 0.62 0.53 
   
D.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Normalized Change) 
Inventory (Nor Ch)  0.171(1.73) 0.076(0.76) 0.248(2.65) 
Sales (Nor Ch)  0.044(2.29) 0.004(0.21)  
Income (Nor Ch)  -0.524(4.77) -0.414(4.16) 
1/Asset  -1.895(0.37) -0.316(0.06) -3.245(0.62) 
const  321.997(8.83) 361.331(9.80) 381.352(14.78) 
   




 Notes:  The table gives the coefficient, followed by 
the absolute value of the t-statistic.  For database 
construction, see text. 
 
 Source:  See Table 1 (various years). 
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Table 12:  Firm Financial Status,  
Trade Credit, and Bank Loans:   




A.  Dependent variable -- Payables (Growth)          
Inventory(Gr)  0.628(14.39)   0.479(10.75) 0.449(10.05) 0.553(12.36) 0.522(11.56) 
Sales(Gr)    0.904(14.62)      
VL Sales (Gr)      -7.130(6.42)     
L Sales (Gr)        -6.422(6.33)   
VLS * Sales Gr          -0.667(3.09) 
LS  *  Sales  Gr        -0.391(2.69) 
VL  Inven  (Gr)         
L  Inven  (Gr)         
VLI  *  Inv  Gr         
LI  *  Inv  Gr         
VH  Sales  (Gr)     5.379(3.51)     
H  Sales  (Gr)      4.783(3.90)    
VHS * Sales Gr          0.203(3.54)   
HS  *  Sales  Gr        0.229(4.53) 
VH  Inven  (Gr)         
H  Inven  (Gr)         
VHI  *  Inv  Gr         
HI  *  Inv  Gr         
Constant 
4.889(7.07
)  -0.065(0.07)  7.755(9.99) 8.327(9.81) 5.834(7.96) 5.842(7.54) 
         
Adjusted R2  0.422  0.43 0.52 0.53 0.46  0.48
         
 
Table Continued on next page. Trade Credit:  Page 40 
Table 12 (Continued) 
 
 
A.  Dependent variable -- Payables (Growth), Continued    
Inventory(Gr)        0.444(9.91) 
Sales(Gr) 0.654(9.93) 0.653(10.19) 0.776(12.04) 0.738(11.63) 
VL Sales (Gr)           
L Sales (Gr)          -6.467(6.41)
VLS * Sales Gr           
LS * Sales Gr           
VL Inven (Gr)  -5.920(5.51)       
L Inven (Gr)    -5.133(5.00)     
VLI * Inv Gr      0.283(1.72)     
LI * Inv Gr        0.157(1.16)  
VH Sales (Gr)           
H Sales (Gr)           
VHS * Sales Gr           
HS * Sales Gr          0.192(4.01) 
VH Inven (Gr)  7.010(4.62)        
H Inven (Gr)    5.636(4.76)       
VHI * Inv Gr      0.235(4.81)     
HI * Inv Gr        0.271(6.35)  
Constant  4.186(3.81) 4.003(3.53) 0.945(1.00) 0.622(0.69)  8.396(9.96) 
         
Adjusted R2  0.52 0.53 0.47 0.499  0.536
 
Table Continued on next page. 
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B.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Growth)             
Inventory(Gr) 0.047(0.80)    0.052(0.78)  0.065(0.97) 0.039(0.61)  0.042(0.65) 
Sales(Gr)    0.032(0.38)      
VL  Sales  (Gr)     0.526(0.32)     
L Sales (Gr)      1.650(1.08)    
VLS * Sales Gr          0.088(0.29)  
LS * Sales Gr            0.225(1.08) 
VL  Inven  (Gr)          
L  Inven  (Gr)          
VLI * Inv Gr             
LI * Inv Gr             
VH  Sales  (Gr)     0.410(0.18)     
H Sales (Gr)        0.960(0.52)    
VHS * Sales Gr          0.051(0.64)  
HS * Sales Gr            0.065(0.90) 
VH  Inven  (Gr)          
H  Inven  (Gr)          
VHI * Inv Gr             
HI * Inv Gr             
Constant 12.301(13.20)  12.413(9.55) 12.085(10.52) 11.344(8.89) 12.176(11.84) 11.634(10.55)
          
Adjusted  R2  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00  -0.01  0.00 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
 
 
B.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Growth), Continued       
Inventory(Gr)       0.057(0.85)
Sales(Gr) 0.012(0.12)  -0.001(0.00) 0.015(0.17)  -0.004(0.04) 
VL Sales (Gr)           
L Sales (Gr)          1.766(1.16)
VLS * Sales Gr          
LS * Sales Gr           
VL Inven (Gr)  0.417(0.26)         
L Inven (Gr)    0.378(0.24)       
VLI * Inv Gr      -0.248(1.06)   
LI * Inv Gr        -0.209(1.07) 
VH Sales (Gr)           
H Sales (Gr)           
VHS * Sales Gr          
HS * Sales Gr          0.067(0.93)
VH Inven (Gr)  2.087(0.93)         
H Inven (Gr)    2.159(1.21)       
VHI * Inv Gr      0.061(0.88)     
HI * Inv Gr        0.073(1.17)   
Constant 12.351(7.58) 12.264(7.19) 12.361(9.24) 12.537(9.59)  11.270(8.88)
        
Adjusted  R2  -0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
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C.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Normalized Change)       
Inventory(Gr)  1.196(14.27)    0.880(10.81) 0.830(10.33) 1.005(12.28) 0.939(11.53)
Sales(Gr)    0.234(16,56)       
VL Sales (Gr)      -254.368(6.93)     
L Sales (Gr)      -212.566(6.40)   
VLS * Sales Gr          -29.890(4.17) 
LS * Sales Gr            -14.809(3.10)
VL  Inven  (Gr)          
L  Inven  (Gr)          
VLI * Inv Gr             
LI * Inv Gr             
VH Sales (Gr)      273.661(5.26)     
H Sales (Gr)        247.714(5.97)   
VHS * Sales Gr          10.300(5.37)  
HS * Sales Gr           
11.435(6.79
) 
VH  Inven  (Gr)          
H  Inven  (Gr)          
VHI * Inv Gr             
HI * Inv Gr             
1/Asset -20.244(3.99)  -6.745(1.42)  -16.608(3.65)  -14.731(3.30)  -16.168(3.40) -13.397(2.87)
Constant 223.433(8.88)  -11.166(0.34)  306.351(11.54) 307.685(10.70)  249.606(9.80) 232.189(8.71)
         
Adjusted  R2  0.43 0.50 0.56 0.58  0.52  0.54 
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C.  Dependent Variable -- Payables (Normalized Change), Continued    
Inventory(Gr)        0.820(10.24) 
Sales(Gr)  0.184(12.41) 0.178(12.34) 0.204(13.85) 0.192(13.51) 
VL Sales (Gr)           
L Sales (Gr)          -212.983(6.47)
VLS * Sales Gr          
LS * Sales Gr           
VL Inven (Gr)  -175.141(5.07)       
L Inven (Gr)    -146.349(4.44)     
VLI * Inv Gr      7.505(1.40)     
LI * Inv Gr        4.284(0.99)   
VH Sales (Gr)           
H Sales (Gr)           
VHS * Sales Gr          
HS * Sales Gr          10.090(6.29) 
VH Inven (Gr)  224.191(4.46)       
H Inven (Gr)    214.281(5.58)     
VHI * Inv Gr      8.101(5.06)     
HI * Inv Gr        9.889(7.23)   
1/Asset  -6.432(1.46) -9.604(2.24) -5.519(1.21) -7.055(1.61)  -14.496(3.27) 
Constant 102.878(2.85) 106.083(2.82) 15.488(0.48) 9.406(0.31)  308.394(10.85)
         
Adjusted  R2  0.58  0.60 0.54 0.58  0.58 
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D.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Normalized Change)          
Inventory(Gr)  0.086(0.99)    0.113(1.16) 0.135(1.37) 0.094(1.01) 0.108(1.14) 
Sales(Gr)    0.105(0.66)     
VL Sales (Gr)      11.425(0.26)      
L Sales (Gr)        33.272(0.82)    
VLS * Sales Gr        1.049(0.13)   
LS * Sales Gr            4.495(0.81) 
VL  Inven  (Gr)          
L  Inven  (Gr)          
VLI * Inv Gr             
LI * Inv Gr             
VH Sales (Gr)      -39.503(0.64)     
H Sales (Gr)        -26.039(0.51)   
VHS * Sales Gr          -0.452(0.21) 
HS * Sales Gr            -0.355(0.18)
VH  Inven  (Gr)          
H  Inven  (Gr)          
VHI * Inv Gr             
HI * Inv Gr             
1/Asset  -0.494(0.09)  0.259(0.05) -1.103(0.20) -1.058(0.19) -0.678(0.13) -0.704(0.13) 
Constant  366.729(13.94) 361.913(9.82) 364.475(11.53) 352.162(10.04)  365.942(12.63) 355.934(11.46)
          
Adjusted  R2  0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
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D.  Dependent Variable -- Loans (Normalized Change), Continued    
Inventory(Gr)      0.125(1.27) 
Sales(Gr)  0.006(0.34) 0.003(0.14) 0.010(0.58) 0.005(0.31)  
VL  Sales  (Gr)       
L  Sales  (Gr)      37.239(0.92)
VLS * Sales Gr       
LS * Sales Gr          
VL Inven (Gr) -9.885(0.24)       
L Inven (Gr)    -9.990(0.24)     
VLI * Inv Gr      -5.789(0.92)   
LI * Inv Gr        -5.062(0.98) 
VH  Sales  (Gr)       
H  Sales  (Gr)       
VHS * Sales Gr       
HS * Sales Gr         -0.270(0.14)
VH Inven (Gr) 26.992(0.44)        
H Inven (Gr)    44.572(0.93)     
VHI * Inv Gr      0.752(0.40)     
HI * Inv Gr        1.462(0.88)   
1/Asset  0.365(0.07) -0.060(0.01) 0.647(0.12) 0.212(0.04) -0.603(0.11)
Constant 369.300(8.41)371.556(7.91)357.636(9.48)364.434(9.85)347.973(9.97)
       






 Notes:  The table gives the coefficient, followed by 
the absolute value of the t-statistic.  For database 
construction, see text. 
 
 Source:  See Table 1 (various years). 
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Figure 1:  Annual Growth Rate in Payables 
 
 



















 Notes:  Firms in manufacturing industries, partitioned 
by number of employees.  Payables include discounted notes. 
 
 Source:  See Table 1 (various years). 
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Figure 2:  Annual Growth Rate in Bank Loans 
 



















 Notes:  Firms in manufacturing industries, partitioned 
by number of employees.  Payables include discounted notes. 
 
 Source:  See Table 1 (various years). 
 
 